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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Common social issues are usually criticized considering the potential interrelationship 
between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and supply chain management. 
Companies and manufacturers in supply chain networks have been pressured by a 
growing concern for CSR from governments, organizations, and consumer, and have 
to bear at least some CSR under policies and regulations. However, naturally, 
members in a decentralized supply chain network make decisions to maximize their 
individual net profits. This thesis aims to allocate CSR to members in a non-integrated 
supply chain over time. Specifically, we formulate a model that crosses through multi-
periods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We then apply control theory and 
calculus variations to obtain an equilibrium point at where both the profits of members 
and the level of CSR taken by Supply Chains are maximized. The findings of this 
thesis serve three subjects: supply chain management, social science, and game theory 
application.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which shows consideration for the environment, 
consumers, charities, minority groups, employee welfare, and community development, 
has received a great deal of attention in recent years. A rapidly growing number of large, 
medium, and even small-sized companies are increasingly focused on CSR. This is 
mainly because, along with rising consumer awareness of the conditions or 
circumstances under which products are manufactured, distributed, and sold, consumers 
often criticize supply chains for several social issues, such as environmental protection, 
safety, ethical implications, and human rights. Not only consumers, but also governments 
and organizations believe that it is high time to interfere in the CSR of supply chains for 
the long-term benefits of society. A variety of regulations and policies related to CSR 
have been made to negotiate and guide contemporary company members of supply 
chains, making it unavoidable for them to assume at least some CSR. 
 
However, in a decentralized supply chain, members, including raw material suppliers, 
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers, try to gain advantages in the 
competitive relationship. They make their decisions based on maximization of their own 
profits, while bearing the burden of CSR may lead to decreased profits. These behaviors 
lead to an equilibrium status at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR 
taken by the supply chain maximizes. Finding the equilibrium of a decentralized supply 
chain on CSR in a time horizon has been a challenge, and modeling a decentralized 
supply chain with CSR has become a topic of great interest from both practical and 
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research perspectives. The main objective of this thesis is to properly formulate this 
problem and find the equilibrium point in the sharing of CSR among the members of an 
supply chain. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis, the supply chain network is modeled as a two-tier, nonintegrated, vertical 
control system involving a supplier and a manufacturer. As a monopolist, the 
manufacturer determines its wholesale price, controls the retail price, and negotiates its 
raw material prices with suppliers. Furthermore, in the thesis, we only consider the social 
obligation dimension of CSR rather than its social voluntary dimension. This means that 
firms are forced by regulations or policies to accept CSR. 
 
This thesis discusses how members in the supply chain system interact with each other in 
such a situation. Specifically, each firm in the supply chain network makes decisions in 
order to maximize its individual net profits; meanwhile the entire SC has to bear certain 
CSR. Consequently, members take as little CSR as possible toward their own benefit. In 
order to deal with the conflict, we applied a long term Stackelberg game and explored the 
equilibrium results of the decentralized supply chain network in which all members take 
CSR into consideration. Optimal amount of CSR is allocated to each member in the 
supply chain. For a better understanding of the allocation of CSR to members in a 
decentralized supply chain network and the decisions the members make in the dynamic 
Stackelberg game to maximize their own profits, a practical case study of Ball 
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Corporation and Coca-Cola is provided, and a numerical example is proposed along with 
highly efficient algorithms. Managerial insights are demonstrated in terms of several 
sensitivity analyses. 
 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
 
In this thesis, we propose a model that perfectly allocates CSR to members in a 
decentralized supply chain through a dynamic Stackelberg game. The remainder of this 
thesis is organized as follows: 
 
In Chapter Two, a general literature review of both CSR and SC management is 
presented. Moreover, this chapter surveys the game theoretic concept applications in 
supply chain analysis, and outlines the game theory-related areas of supply chain 
management.  
 
In Chapter Three, a model to allocate CSR to members in a three-tier, multi-period, and 
decentralized supply chain network model is presented and each manufacturer’s degree 
of investment into CSR is clarified to ensure maximum profits. Specifically, Chapter 
Three shows how CSR is evaluated as capital, and why the application of dynamic 
Stackelberg game theory is necessary to apply to this model. The fundamental 
knowledge of the model and criteria for choosing different game theories are explained. 
The assumptions and notation of the model are defined. Two formulations are provided 
the leader of the game being either the supplier or the manufacturer. 
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In Chapter Four, practical case study of Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola is provided, and 
a numerical example is proposed along with highly efficient algorithms. We analyze the 
results of the two cases in terms of three criteria, profits, the amount of investment, and 
the level of social responsibility taken by the supply chain. According to the analysis of 
the results, we conclude that choosing Ball Corporation as the leader of the game 
provides several advantages in many respects. 
 
In Chapter Five, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by changing the values of several 
parameters. The sensitivities of time horizon, tax return rates, and social benefit 
parameters of the firms are discussed. Finally, based on the sensitivity analyses, 
managerial insights are highlighted. 
 
In Chapter Six, we provide a summary of this work. Some future research directions are 
also discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this thesis, the literature review is divided into those articles regarding corporate social 
responsibility, and those on game theoretic applications in supply chain management. 
 
2.1     Literature Review of CSR 
 
In recent years, a growing number of large, medium, and even small- sized companies 
have increasingly focused on CSR. They have realized the need to develop strategies that 
extend their traditional corporate governance processes beyond firm boundaries to their 
supply chain partners (Kytle & Ruggie, 2005). Firms have embraced the importance of 
working collaboratively with their supply chain partners to enhance their CSR 
performance (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996).  
 
Not only companies, but also governments, organizations, and consumers have been 
considering CSR. A variety of regulations and policies related to social responsibility 
have been made to negotiate and guide the members of the entire supply chain. For 
instance, after the financial misrepresentation at leading companies, such as Enron 
(Prentice, 2003) and WorldCom (Hitzig, 2004), led to extensive loss of investor savings, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was established to make companies accurately account for their 
corporate financial reporting (Bernardi & LaCross, 2005),  Between 2000 and 2007, 
approximately 50 international framework agreements were negotiated in the field of 
CSR between multinational companies and international trade union federations to 
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define labor standards for the workers of the company workers, their subsidiaries and, in 
many cases, their subcontractors (Sobczak, 2007).  
 
Moreover, along with rising consumer awareness of the conditions or circumstances 
under which products are manufactured, distributed, and sold, consumers have criticized 
several social issues, such as environmental protection, safety, ethical implications, and 
human rights, considering the potential interrelationship between social responsibility 
and supply chain management. For instance, consumers and non-government 
organizations criticized Nike regarding sweatshop labor issues at its overseas suppliers. 
Nike initially declined social responsibility for its supply chain partners but later shifted 
its stance under increased public pressure (Zadek, 2004). The entire apparel industry now 
takes a more diligent approach to supply chain CSR, employing extensive supplier labor 
codes (Emmelhainz & Adams, 1999). Since consumers have started to be concerned 
about the behavior of food companies and their level of social responsibility in ensuring 
quality standards, the food industry has been used as a reference example to elucidate the 
role of CSR in achieving competitive advantage (Maloni & Brown, 2006). 
 
2.1.1     Definition of CSR 
 
Although CSR is a well-established concept, there is not a general consensus on the 
meaning of CSR in practice (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2000; Joyner & Payne, 2002; Roberts, 
2003). There is an apparent lack of a consistent definition of CSR, mainly because the 
nature of the relationship between business and society fluctuates with the relevant issues 
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of the day, and partly because of the problem of operationally determining the 
managerial implications of such a definition (Canoll & Buchholtz, 2000). In another 
words, the definitions of concepts used to identify the nature of CSR, such as sustainable 
development, corporate citizenship, sustainable entrepreneurship, the triple bottom line, 
and business ethics, are never really clear (Marrewijk & Werre, 2003). Since there is no 
certainty as to how CSR is defined in either the corporate or academic world, some 
scholars claim that there is not a basic definition for CSR (Jackson & Hawker, 2001); 
however in fact, there are productive definitions rather than not just one, because people 
talk about CSR as it applies to specific interests, which makes the interpretations of CSR 
different and biased (Van Marrewijk, 2003). There is no methodology to verify whether 
those definitions are biased or not; hence, an unbiased definition has not been developed.  
 
2.1.2     Methodology of Definition of CSR  
 
Based on the existing productive definitions, attempts have been made to develop a 
robust and clear definition of CSR. In so doing, three common methodologies have been 
applied to derive an expectant definition. 
 
Since Bowen established the first formal definition of CSR (Carroll, 1999), many 
researchers have attempted to derive and update portable definitions of CSR based on 
literature reviews. For instance, Moir (2001) combined Bowen’s definition with some 
concepts of business management, while Joyner and Payne (2002) and Garter and 
Jennings (2004) compiled a comprehensive summary of all available definitions. 
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Without these literature reviews, the history of CSR definitions could not be tracked and 
overviewed. 
 
Other scholars have conducted interviews to address the social construction of CSR, 
mainly because the points of view of respondents concerning CSR are easily recorded 
and analyzed through interviews. For example, O’Dwyer (2002) investigated the 
interpretations of CSR from 29 managers. Azer (2001) explored three popular definitions 
of CSR in terms of the results of interviews of 11 business representatives. Although 
interviews indicate in-depth knowledge regarding the social nature of CSR, this 
methodological approach has its own drawback. Interviews usually focus on specific 
questions and limited details; therefore, it is relatively difficult to demonstrate a general 
definition. 
 
In this decade, CSR has been interpreted by many other theories. For instance, Van 
Marrewijk (2003) philosophically analyzed the definitions of CSR. Matten and Crane 
(2005) defined CSR by introducing the term of citizenship in political science. Gobbels 
(2002) corrected that CSR is actually corporate societal accountability according to 
linguistics. These diverse approaches indicate that CSR is a multi-disciplined concept. 
 
2.1.3     Analysis of definitions of CSR 
 
A comprehensive analysis of 37 definitions of CSR was conducted by Alexander 
Dahlsrud (2006). These 37 definitions were gathered through an extensive review of the 
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literature, involving both journal articles and web pages. The definitions originated from 
27 authors and covered the time span from 1980 to 2003, although most definitions were 
published from 1998 onwards. The definitions were primarily of European and American 
origin, but definitions from India and Canada were also included (Dahlsrud, 2006). 
 
In Dahlsrud’s paper, the 37 definitions are divided into five dimensions, which are 
named to reflect the content of the phrases of coding schemes. The dimensions to which 
each definition is categorized are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
The frequency counts are derived from Google, the largest and most commonly used 
search engine. The frequency counts of these 37 definitions referring to a specific 
dimension were summed to give the dimension scores. By dividing the dimension score 
by the sum of frequency counts for all the definitions, a dimension ratio was calculated 
to evaluate the relative use of each dimension. The dimension score and dimension ratio 
for each of the five dimensions in CSR definitions are discussed. Moreover, to analyze 
how many dimensions consist of a definition, frequency counts are defined in this article. 
Dahlsrud summarized the number of dimensions included in each definition and their 
percentage of the total frequency count, in frequency order. 
 
2.1.4     Features of CSR 
 
There is no argument about certain features of CSR are obvious. CSR consists of 
economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities, along with voluntary or philanthropic 
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responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 1991). Social responsibility is part of a firm’s social 
activities as well as its social obligations (Sethi, 1975).  
  
Based on the two main characteristics of CSR, the link between business and the larger 
society and the activities for environmental and social issues (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2000; 
Marrewijk & Werre, 2003), the content of CSR can be extended to many aspects, 
including the environment (Shrivastava, 1995), diversity (Clair et al., 1997), human 
rights (Jennings & Entine, 1999), philanthropy (Clarkson, 1995), and safety (Wokutch, 
1992). The key achieved consensus on the concept of CSR is that this new subject should 
be viewed as interdisciplinary. 
 
2.1.5     Significance of CSR 
 
There are numerous underlying incentives to explain the popularity of CSR. According 
to early research, there is a relationship between a company’s corporate reputation and 
performance indicators, such as profitability and customer satisfaction (Porter & Kramer, 
2006; Chad & Fraser, 2006; Schiebel & Pochtrager, 2003; Murphy & Verschoor, 2002; 
Simpson & Kohers, 2002). 
 
Also, a great number of researchers claim that CSR has a significant impact on the 
purchasing decisions of firms (Roberts, 2003; Bowersox, 1998; Stock, 1990). In other 
words, it is prudent for companies to anticipate future CSR issues in their supply chains, 
and to integrate supply chain CSR standards into daily operations. For example, for firms 
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in the clothing industry, the external pressure from social organizations and consumers 
can be relatively eased by CSR; manufacturers in food chains can more easily manage 
and control their suppliers and retailers to maintain the quality standard of their products.  
 
CSR is an opportunity for some firms, such as the Fair Trade organization, to show their 
consideration for ethics and society. Therefore, a great number of companies operate 
intending to promote CSR through cooperation with supply chain partners.  
 
All case studies about CSR demonstrate that developing an effective strategy can reward 
companies with reputation enhancement, license to operate, avoidance of litigation, 
recruitment and retention of employees, and the development of processes, products, and 
strategic innovations. It is, therefore, obvious that companies have begun to see the 
strategic advantages of being socially responsible and to work on their social, 
environmental, and economic issues.  
 
2.1.6     Previous studies on CSR  
 
In the early research, many CSR studies were in the form of case studies. Researchers 
tended to use large companies as examples to demonstrate how CSR activities are 
beneficial for long-term development by effecting their strategies and performance in the 
long run. Moreover, many researchers were interested in understanding entrepreneurs’ 
motivations to participate in CSR. Basically, some firms consider CSR a way to enhance 
their reputation due to public concerns over social issues, such as the environment, 
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human rights, and ethics. Other companies adopt CSR because they believe it promotes 
long-term profits in many respects, including stable suppliers, low cost delivery, and 
extended market demand. These benefits are proved by some well-known case studies of 
large international companies, such as Nike, Gap, H&M, Wal-Mart, and Mattel (Frost & 
Burnett, 2007). For example, to integrate CSR into its business model, Gap Inc., 
developed an effective labor standards assurance program, which has innovated its 
business strategy over time. 
 
Based on these case studies, some scholars have a more macroscopic point of view of the 
significance of CSR in the supply chain. Corporate social responsibility is viewed as an 
organizational philosophy that directs firms to consider and minimize the social impact 
of their profit making activities, which may detract from the core function of a business – 
profits. Indeed, scholars studying CSR have long debated the significance of CSR in 
supply chain management. Some researchers advocate that CSR incurs additional 
operational costs and limits a firm’s strategic choices (Ullmann, 1985; Vance, 1975); 
while others argue that there is no link between CSR and financial performance (Abbot 
& Monsen, 1979). Recently, a reached consensus on the impact of CSR on SCM is that a 
positive relationship between CSR and SCM definitely improves a firm’s own benefits 
(Cornell & Shapiro, 1987; Moskowitz, 1972; Spicer, 1978).  
 
According to these previous studies, involvement of CSR is actually beneficial for the 
long-term strategy of members in a supply chain system from many aspects. Firstly, a 
comprehensive consideration of the economic, ecological, and social aspects of business 
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practice contributes to the sustainability of a supply chain (Svensson, 2007). In addition, 
CSR is critical for effective supply chain management to facilitate coordination across 
purchasing, manufacturing, distribution, and marketing functions (Hervani & Helms, 
2005). Excluding sustainability of supply networks, corporate reputation and even 
company image, which are characterized by consumer activism and profile brands, are 
attributed to CSR (Roberts, 2003). 
 
2.1.7     Modeling of CSR 
 
A supply chain usually includes raw material suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, 
wholesalers, and retailers. Each member in the supply chain tries to gain advantages, 
whether in a competitive or in a cooperative relationship. These behaviors will 
eventually lead to an equilibrium status in a decentralized supply chain network. 
Researchers point out that a member in a supply chain may change its behavior to 
increase its own profit; this voluntary shift may induce decreased total profit. Therefore, 
modeling a decentralized supply chain has become a topic of great interest from both 
practical and research perspectives in order to generalize the network structure and 
simplify the study of supply chains (Lee & Billington, 1993). Lee and Billington (1993) 
point out the importance of developing decentralized supply chain models that allow for 
a generalized network structure and simple computation. Lederer and Li (1997) analyze 
competition among firms having customers who are sensitive to delay time. Nagurney et 
al. (2002a) present a supply chain network equilibrium model consisting of three-tier 
decision makers in a network with governing equilibrium conditions. Nagurney et al. 
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(2002b) extend their approach to include electronic commerce in the form of business-to-
business and business-to-consumer transactions. Dong et al. (2002) consider multi-
criteria decision making within a supply chain but with only two tiers of decision makers. 
Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) extend previous work to consider three tiers of supply 
chain. Dong et al. (2003, 2004) introduce random demands into a two-tier supply chain 
network model. Nagurney et al. (2005) develop a multi-criteria supply chain network 
model in which both physical and electronic transactions are allowed, and supply-side as 
well as demand-side risks are included in the formulation.  
 
Indeed, equilibrium modeling is not new in many fields, such as transportation (Florian 
& Hearn, 1995), economics (Arrow & Intrilligator, 1982), and finance (Nagurney & 
Siokos, 1997). However, game theory and equilibrium models were not applied to CSR 
study until two decades ago. Sethi (1975) introduced a taxonomy in which a firm’s social 
activities include social obligations as well as more voluntary social responsibility. 
Carroll (1979, 1991) developed a framework for CSR that consists of economic, legal, 
and ethical responsibilities. Carter et al. (2000) explored the effect of environmental 
purchasing on firm performance and show that environmental purchasing is significantly 
related to both net income and cost of goods sold. Carter and Jennings (2002) also 
suggest that CSR has a direct and positive impact on supplier performance. Other CSR 
activities identified in the literature involve the environment (Shrivastava, 1995), human 
rights (Jennings & Entine, 1999), philanthropy (Clarkson, 1995), and safety (Wokutch, 
1992).  
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Although these CSR activities show consideration for the environment, consumers, 
charities, minority groups, employee welfare, community development, and so on, it is 
difficult to evaluate the value or benefit of these efforts, because they are rarely 
considered in the context of supply chain management.  
 
2.2       Supply Chain Management and Game Theory  
 
Before the literature reviews of game theoretic concepts applications in supply chain 
management and game theory-related areas of supply chain management, a general 
literature review of supply chain management and game theory is presented. 
 
2.2.1      Supply Chain Management 
 
A supply chain is "a system of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and 
customers where materials flow downstream from suppliers to customers and 
information flows in both directions" (Tayur, Ganeshan and Magazine, 1999). Supply 
chain management also can be defined as a set of management processes. For example, 
SCM is defined by LaLonde as "the process of managing relationships, information, and 
materials flow across enterprise borders to deliver enhanced customer service and 
economic value through synchronized management of the flow of physical goods and 
associated information from sourcing to consumption" (Mentzer, 2001).  
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Following LaLonde, many SCM-related researchers have devoted themselves to 
operations management and marketing problems, such as inventory control, production 
and pricing competition, capacity investments, service and product quality competition, 
advertising and new product introduction. For example, Tayur, Ganeshan and Magazine 
(1999) edited a book emphasizing quantitative models for SCM, and proposed a 
taxonomic review and a framework to help both practitioners and academic researchers 
better understand the current state of SCM research. Wilcox, Howell, Kuzdrall and 
Britney (1987) presented a brief survey of the papers on the price-quantity discount. 
McAlister (1988) reviewed a model of distribution channels incorporating behavior 
dimensions.  
 
Most significant and interesting topics arising in SCM emphasize the coordination and 
competition among members in a supply chain channel. In a centralized supply chain the 
"central" decision maker may coordinate the members' activities in order to increase the 
competitive capability of the entire supply chain. game theory is not used in these types 
of centralized problems. On the contrary, in a decentralized supply chain, each supply 
chain member is an independent decision maker. Consequently, various game-related 
issues arise in the analysis of decentralized supply chains with competition; besides, 
supply chain members may agree to a contract to coordinate their strategies in order to 
improve the global performance of the system as well as their individual profits. For this 
type of decentralized supply chain with coordination, channel members may not only 
achieve supply chain-wide optimization but they also would have no incentives to 
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deviate from the global optimal solution. Naturally, a prime methodological tool for 
dealing with these problems is non-cooperative game theory, which focuses on the 
simultaneous or sequential decision-making of multiple players under complete or 
incomplete information (Leng & Parlar, 2005). 
 
2.2.2      Game Theory 
 
Since game theory was established to solve problems involving conflict and cooperation 
in the early 1940s, it has been often applied in diverse areas, such as anthropology, 
auctions, biology, business, economics, management labor arbitration, philosophy, 
politics and warfare. Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing situations in which the 
decisions of multiple agents affect each agent’s payoff; therefore, game theory is usually 
used to deal with interactive optimization problems. Many economists in the past few 
centuries have worked on what can be considered game-theoretic models. John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern are formally credited as the fathers of modern game 
theory. Their classic book, ―Theory of Games and Economic Behavior‖ published in 
1944, summarizes the basic concepts existing at that time.  
 
In the last five decades, there has been a radical increase in the number of publications 
about applications of game theory in operational research and industrial management. As 
Citing Shubik (1955) said, ―In the 50s ... game theory was looked upon as a curio- sum 
not to be taken seriously by any behavioral scientist. By the late 1980s, game theory in 
the new industrial organization has taken over ... game theory has proved its success in 
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many disciplines‖. Coincident with the increase, several reviews focusing on the 
application of game theory in economics or management science appeared. Shubik (1995) 
first gave an early survey of game theoretic applications in management science. 
Feichtinger and Jorgensen (1983) published a review that was restricted to differential 
game applications in management science and operations research. More recently, Wang 
and Parlar (1989) presented a survey of static game theory applications in management 
science problems. Jorgensen (1982) gave a review of applications of differential games 
in advertising.  
 
However, not until the last two decades has there been a renewed interest by academics 
and practices in the management of supply chains; new emphasis has been placed on the 
interactions among the decision makers constituting a supply chain. This has resulted in 
a proliferation of publications in scattered journals dealing with the use of game theory 
in the analysis of supply chain-related problems (Leng & Parlar, 2005). 
 
2.3     Game Theoretic Concepts Applications in Supply Chain Management  
 
In the last few years, the two most important reviews among those focusing on game 
theoretical applications in supply chain management were published. The first review 
outlines game theoretic concepts and surveys the applications of game theory in supply 
chain management (Cachon & Netessine, 2004). Cachon and Netessine classified games 
developed for SCM into four categories based on game theoretical techniques. In each 
category, the authors presented the major techniques that are commonly used in the 
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existing papers and those that could be applied in future research. Another famous 
reviewer overviewed approximately 130 papers based on a classification of SCM topics 
(Leng & Parlar, 2005). Unlike Cachon and Netessine, who highlighted game-theoretical 
techniques, Leng and Parlar focused on the operation areas of SCM to which the game 
theory is applied. 
 
In this section, we introduce the Game theoretic concepts applications in supply chain 
management. According to the literature review of Cachon and Netessine, games that 
were developed for supply chain management can be classified into four categories. 
They are Non-cooperative static games, dynamic games, cooperative games, and 
signaling, screening and Bayesian games. We first introduce non-cooperative games, the 
type of game that has received the most attention in the recent SCM literature. Other 
game theoretic concepts, such as cooperative games and dynamic games, are discussed 
next. 
 
2.3.1     Non-cooperative Static Games 
 
Although some instances of using similar concepts date back several centuries, the 
solution of non-cooperative game theory was formally introduced by John Nash in 1950. 
In the usual form of non-cooperative static games, the players choose strategies 
simultaneously and commit to their chosen strategies. Non-cooperative game theory 
seeks a rational prediction of how the game will be played in practice. A player’s 
strategy can be thought of as the complete instruction for which actions are to take in the 
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game. For example, a player can give his or her strategy to a person that has absolutely 
no knowledge of the player’s payoff or preferences, and that person should be able to use 
the instructions contained in the strategy to choose the actions the player desires. As a 
result, each player’s set of feasible strategies must be independent of the strategies 
chosen by the other players; in other words, the strategy choice by one player is not 
allowed to limit the feasible strategies of another player..  
 
2.3.2     Cooperative Games 
 
The subject of cooperative games first appeared in the seminal work of von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944). However, for many years, cooperative game theory did not gain 
as much attention in the economics literature as non-cooperative game theory. 
Cooperative game theory involves a major shift in paradigms as compared to non-
cooperative game theory; the former focuses on the outcome of the game in terms of the 
value created through cooperation of a subset of players but does not specify the actions 
that each player will take, while the latter is more concerned with the specific actions of 
the players. Also, unlike non-cooperative games, in which the players are unable to make 
binding commitments before choosing their strategies, in a cooperative game, players are 
able to make binding commitments; in a cooperative game, players can make side-
payments and form coalitions. Hence, cooperative game theory allows the modeling of 
outcomes of complex business processes that otherwise might be too difficult to describe, 
such as negotiations, answering more general questions, and determining how well the 
firm is positioned against competition (Brandenburger &Stuart, 2000). However, papers 
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employing cooperative game theory to study supply chain management were scarce. The 
first paper employing cooperative games in SCM was one by Wang and Parlar (1994), 
who analyzed the newsvendor game with three players, first in a non-cooperative setting 
and then under cooperation with and without Transferable Utility. However, application 
of cooperative game theory is becoming more popular due to the prevalence of 
bargaining and negotiations in supply chains.  
 
2.3.3      Dynamic Games 
 
While most SCM models are static, including all newsvendor-based models, a significant 
portion of SCM literature is devoted to dynamic models, in which decisions are made 
over time. The three dynamic games that are often applied to SCM are the Stackelberg 
game, stochastic game, and differential game. 
 
2.3.3.1     Sequential Moves: Stackelberg Game 
 
In 1934, Stackelberg introduced the simplest dynamic game, which was named after him. 
In a Stackelberg duopoly model, the leader chooses a strategy first, and then the follower 
observes this decision and makes his own strategy choice. Intuitively, the first player 
chooses the best possible point on the second player’s best response function. Clearly, 
the first player can choose a Nash Equilibrium, so the leader is always at least as well off 
as he would be in NE. Hence, if a player were allowed to choose between making moves 
simultaneously or being a leader in a game with complete information, he would always 
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prefer to be the leader. However, if new information is revealed after the leader makes a 
play, then it is not always advantageous to be the leader. Whether the follower is better 
off in the Stackelberg or simultaneous move game depends on the specific problem 
setting. To find the equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, which is often called the 
Stackelberg equilibrium, we need to solve a dynamic multi-period problem via 
backwards induction. Actually, the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium is easy to 
demonstrate, given the continuous payoff functions. However, uniqueness may be 
considerably more difficult to demonstrate. Even though there are some difficulties in 
application of Stackelberg game, it has still been considered a popular and appropriable 
method to solve dynamic problems in SCM. 
 
2.3.3.2     Simultaneous Moves: Repeated and Stochastic Games 
 
A different type of dynamic game arises when both players take actions in multiple 
periods. The two major types of multiple-period games are non-time-dependent dynamic 
games and time-dependent dynamic games in the multi-period game without time 
dependence, the exact same game is played over and over again; hence, the term repeated 
games. The strategy for each player is now a sequence of actions taken in all periods. In 
this case, there are no links between successive periods other than the players’ memory 
about actions taken in all the previous periods. Although repeated games have been 
extensively analyzed in economics literature, it is awkward in an SCM setting to assume 
that nothing links successive games; typically, in SCM, there is some transfer of 
inventory and/or backorders between periods. Consequently, repeated games, thus far, 
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have not found many applications in SCM literature. In time-dependent multi-period 
games, players’ payoffs in each period depend on actions taken in the previous, as well 
as current, periods. Typically, the payoff structure does not change from period to period 
(so-called stationary payoffs). Clearly, such a setup closely resembles multi-period 
inventory models, in which time periods are connected through the transfer of 
inventories and backlogs. Due to this similarity, time-dependent games have found 
applications in SCM literature. The most often used time-dependent multi-period game 
in SCM is stochastic games or Markov games.  
 
2.3.3.3     Differential Games 
 
Discrete dynamic games in discrete time involve a sequence of decisions that are 
separated in time; while differential games provide a natural extension for decisions that 
have to be made continuously. The standard tools needed to analyze differential games 
are the calculus of variations or optimal control theory (Kamien & Schwartz, 1981). In a 
standard optimal control problem, a single decision-maker sets the control variable that 
affects the state of the system. In contrast, in differential games, several players select 
control variables that may affect a common state variable and/or the payoffs of all 
players. Hence, differential games can be regarded as a natural extension of the optimal 
control theory. There are two distinct types of player strategies in a differential game: 
open-loop and closed-loop, which is also sometimes called feedback. In the open-loop 
strategy, the players select their decisions or control variables once at the beginning of 
the game and do not change them so that the control variables are only functions of time 
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and do not depend on the other players’ strategies. Open-loop strategies are simpler in 
that they can be found through the straightforward application of optimal controls, which 
makes them quite popular. In contrast, in a closed-loop strategy, the player bases his 
strategy on current time and the states of both players’ systems. Hence, feedback 
strategies are subgame-perfect. There are numerous applications for differential games in 
economics and marketing, especially in the area of dynamic pricing.  Since many SC 
models rely on continuous-time processes, it is natural to assume that differential games 
should be intensively applied in SCM literature. However, the applications of differential 
games in SCM are quite limited, even though they may be popular in some disciplines 
(Basar & Olsder, 1999).  
 
2.4      Game Theory– Related Areas of Supply Chain Managment 
 
Supply chain-related game theoretical applications are found in five categories. There are 
inventory games with fixed unit purchase cost, inventory games with quantity discounts, 
production and pricing competitions, games with other attributes and games with joint 
decisions on inventory, and those with production/pricing and other attributes (Leng & 
Parlar, 2005).  
 
2.4.1     Inventory Games with Fixed Unit Purchase Cost  
 
Inventory management problems involving competition may arise in either horizontal or 
vertical channels; however a great number of articles about competition of inventory 
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management are in horizontal channels. Parlar (1988) developed a single period context 
game theoretic model of competition between two players. He proved the existence and 
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and showed that cooperation between two players 
can increase their profits. Wang and Parlar (1994) extended the model to describe a 
three-person game in the same context, a single-period inventory competition with 
substitutable products. More recently, Avar and Baykal-Gursoy (2002) extended Parlar's 
model to the infinite horizon and lost-sales case and examined a two-person non-zero-
sum stochastic game under the discounted payoff criterion. In another early work on 
single-period models, Nti (1987) examined an inventory procurement model with n 
competitive organizations. In a random demand setting, Nti proved that a unique Nash 
equilibrium exists. Lippman and McCardle (1997) analyzed a competitive newsboy 
mode in both oligopoly and duopoly contexts. In Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001), a more 
general model with inventory competition was analyzed with dynamic choice behaviour 
of heterogeneous consumers and its effect on firms' inventories and profits. Anupindi, 
Bassok, and Zemel (2001) developed a general framework to analyze two-stage 
decentralized distribution systems where retailers face stochastic demands. Granot and 
Sosic (2003) extended the results to a three-stage model. 
 
Meanwhile, the vertical competition issues related to inventory control were also studied. 
Cachon (1999) considered a two-echelon competitive supply chain inventory problem 
with a single supplier and a single retailer that faces stochastic demand. Cachon showed 
that there is a pair of unique Nash equilibria, and that equilibrium is not an optimal 
solution for global supply chain performance. Cachon then extended the above models to 
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analyze the competitive and cooperative inventory issue in a two-echelon supply chain 
with one supplier and a few retailers. Wang, Guo, and Efstathiou (2004) extended the 
model to a one-supplier and retailer situation where the supply from the supplier might 
not satisfy the demand of multiple retailers. In their model, the authors separated 
sufficient supply from the supplier and insufficient supplies from the supplier.  
 
Moreover, several Nash equilibrium contracts were designed for system-wide optimal 
cooperation. Raghunathan (2003)  considered a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply 
chain with correlated demand at the retailer and applied the Shapley value concept to 
analyze the expected manufacturer and retailer shares of the surplus incurred due to 
information sharing. The author examined the impact of demand correlation on the value 
of information sharing and the relative incentives of manufacturers and retailers to form 
information sharing partnerships. Another paper in this area is by Corbett (2001) who 
studied the well-known model in a supplier-buyer supply chain with conflicting 
objectives and asymmetric information.  
 
2.4.2      Inventory Games with Quantity Discounts   
 
Quantity discount policy is a common marketing scheme adopted in many industries. 
With this policy, the buyer has an incentive to increase his/her purchase quantity to 
obtain a lower unit price. The quantity discount scheme plays an important role in the 
analysis of two-stage vertical supply chains.  
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Recently, several reviews focusing on quantity discounts have been published. Monahan 
(1984) developed and analyzed a quantity discount model to determine the optimal 
quantity discount schedule for a vendor. However, Joglekar (1988) pointed out some 
shortcomings as well as the contribution of this previous model. The shortcomings are 
due to several implicit assumptions that make Monahan's results impractical. In response 
to these comments, Monahan (1988) argued that the principal purpose is to provide an 
introductory model in this area. Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) also extended Monahan's 
model by addressing two important issues, which are to impose some constraints on the 
amount of price discount so as to make it less than the selling price of the product, and to 
revise the order-to-order assumption to the situation for the supplier to order a larger 
quantity than the buyer's order amount.  
 
Lai and Staelin (1984) investigated the same problem with Monahan's model, under 
cooperative and competitive environments. Extending Lai and Staelin's work, Kohli and 
Park (1989) examined a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts to analyze 
a transaction-efficiency rationale for quantity discounts offered in a bargaining context. 
Kim and Hwang(1989) studied the effects of quantity discount on supplier's profit and 
buyer's cost in the competitive and cooperative contexts. They explored how the supplier 
decides the discount schedule, given the assumption that the buyer always behaves 
optimally by using the classic EOQ inventory decision. Chiang et al. (1994) investigated 
the game theoretic discount problem in both two-stage competition and cooperative 
contexts. Similar to the papers by Chiang, Jeuiand and Shugan (1983), Parlar and Wang 
(1994) investigated the discounting scheme of the seller and a linear ordering decision of 
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a group of homogeneous customers in a game framework. The effect of a discount 
scheme on joint maximum gain for the seller and the buyer was also examined. An 
extension of this model was also studied by Parlar and Wang (1995) with incomplete 
information. Another similar work was published by Corbett and Groote (2000). 
 
In a paper on cooperation, Weng (1995) presented a model for analyzing the impact of 
joint decision policies on channel coordination in a supply chain including a supplier and 
a group of homogeneous buyers. Weng showed that quantity discounts alone are not 
sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization, and that all unit and incremental 
discount policies have the same effect on coordination under complete information. Li 
and Huang (1995) also addressed the problem of cooperation between seller and buyer. 
By utilizing the uniform quantity discount policy in a Stackelberg game system, Wang 
(2001) also investigated the coordination issue between a vendor (supplier) and a group 
of independent buyers. Chen, Federgruen, and Zheng (2001) adopted a power-of-two 
policy to coordinate the replenishments within a decentralized supply chain with one 
supplier and multiple retailers. Wang (2004) considered a similar decentralized supply 
chain and developed a coordination strategy that combines integer-ratio time 
coordination and uniform quantity discounts. Wang showed that integer-ratio time 
coordination provides a better coordination mechanism than power-of-two time 
coordination. Further, Wang and Wu (2000) proposed an optimal quantity discount 
schedule for a supplier with different buyers. 
 
2.4.3      Production and Pricing Competition 
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The earliest publications dealing with production/pricing competition are from Cournot 
(1838) and Bertrand (1883). Coumot derived the production equilibrium in a market 
where two producers supply similar products to the same market, while Bertrand focused 
on pricing equilibrium. A large number of papers extending Coumot and Bertrand's 
results have appeared in economics and management science literature. Shapley and 
Shubik (1838) applied game theory to study a monopolistic price competition among 
sellers with differentiated products. Levitan and Shubik (1971) studied price variation 
and duopoly. Hutchinson and Meyer (2002) investigated the impact of a firm’s 
reputation on its pricing equilibrium strategies. Joint production and pricing strategies 
were also considered. Klemperer and Meyer (1986) analyzed the Nash equilibrium prices 
and quantities as strategic variables in a one-stage duopolistic game with differentiated 
products. Using a differential game approach, Jorgensen (1986) considered a continuous-
time game problem to compute optimal production, and purchasing and pricing policies 
in a two-stage vertical channel involving one manufacturer and one retailer. Corbett and 
Karmarkar (2001) developed an explicit game model of Nash-characterized and Coumot 
competition in serial multi-tier supply chains with price-sensitive linear deterministic 
demand.  
 
Other papers focus on price constraints. The first publication emphasizing channel 
cooperation in this category was by Zusman and Etgar (1981) with a combined 
application of economic contract theory and Nash bargaining theory. McGuire and 
Staelin (1983) studied four industry structures induced by two types of channel systems, 
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consisting of two manufacturers. They (1983) also studied the effect of product 
substitutability on Nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly competitive 
system. For the decentralized competitive problem mentioned, Moonhy (1988) studied 
the effect of strategic interaction on the Nash equilibrium strategy. Dong and Rudi (2004) 
proposed a game model for supply chain interaction between a manufacturer and a 
number of retailers with a transshipment scheme. 
 
Several recent papers have investigated pricing policy used as a means for coordinating 
supply chains. Zhao and Wang (2002) developed a Stackelberg game for a two-level 
supply chain where a manufacturer acts as leader and a distributor/retailer acts as 
follower. Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess (2003) developed a price-setting game for a two-
level supply chain where a manufacturer directly sells a single product to online 
customers rather than via his independent retailers. Choi (1991) studied the effect of the 
existence of a channel intermediary on the intensity of horizontal competition between 
two manufacturers. He considered two Stackelberg games and one Nash game between 
the two manufacturers and one common retailer. 
 
The Stackelberg equilibrium was also found explicitly in terms of the model parameters. 
With the linear demand function, Choi (1991) reached the conclusion that it benefits a 
manufacturer to maintain exclusive retailers, while a retailer should prefer to have 
several manufacturers. Trivedi (1998) extended and analyzed three channel structures 
dealing with competition at both the two-manufacturer and two-retailer levels. Kadiyali, 
Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2000) also extended Choi's work by allowing a continuum 
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of possible channel integration between manufacturers and a retailer instead of three-
channel interaction games.  
 
2.4.4       Games with Other Attributes   
 
Various other papers are concerned with diverse topics, such as capacity decisions, 
service quality, product quality, advertising, and new product introduction. 
 
2.4.4.1     Capacity Decisions  
 
Cachon and Lariviere (1999) conducted an equilibrium analysis on a capacity-
constrained system where a supplier utilizes linear, proportional, and uniform allocation 
schedules. They (1999) also applied manipulated and truth-inducing capacity allocation 
schemes to study a retailer’s order behavior and a supplier's capacity choice problem. 
Furthermore, Cachon and Lariviere (2001) investigated a forecast sharing model of a 
manufacturer and a supplier. Mallik and Harker developed a game model involving 
multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers who forecast the 
means of their respective demand and capacity distributions. Hall and Porteus (2000) 
considered a game where firms compete on capacity investment for market share; they 
assumed that the market share of either firm depends on the prior realized level of 
customer service. 
 
2.4.4.2     Service Quality  
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A firm's response time to customer demand is an important factor implicitly affecting its 
profitability. Kalai, Kamien, and Rubinovitch (1992) proposed a two-server game 
theoretic model with exponential service time and Poisson arrival of customers. Gans 
(2002) developed a model of many suppliers competing on service quality for customers 
whose choices respond to random variation of quality. The following papers examined 
other models associated with service quality. Cohen and Wang (1997) developed a 
Stackelberg game model of product life cycle. Chu and Desai (1995) proposed a game 
model to describe a manufacturer motivating a retailer with two incentive schedules, 
such as Consumer Satisfaction assistance and a Consumer Satisfaction Index bonus.  
 
2.4.4.3      Product Quality  
 
The literature related to product quality competition in supply chain management is 
limited. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) determined the effect of contract parameters on the 
quality of the end product in a vertical channel including a supplier and a producer. 
Extending Reyniers and Tapiero's model, Lim (2001) designed producer-supplier 
contracts with incomplete information. The paper, emphasizing the product quality 
signaling mechanism, was published by Chu and Chu (1994), who analyzed a game 
theoretical model of a manufacturer selling a product through a reputable retailer to 
signal its product quality. It was shown that, in equilibrium, manufacturers of high 
quality distribute their product through highly reputable retailers, while, in turn, 
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manufacturers of low quality distribute products through retailers without prominent 
reputations.  
 
2.4.4.4      Advertising and New Product Introduction  
 
One of the earliest game theory models for an oligopolistic market with advertising 
competition was developed by Balch (1971). In this paper, each market decides on the 
advertising outlay to maximize its individual profit and market share in the next 
production/marketing period. Another early paper by Deal (1979) determines the optimal 
time of advertising expenditure over a finite planning horizon in a dynamic duopoly 
competitive situation. Amaldoss et al. (2000) examined three types of strategic alliances 
that may help participants to compete, such as same-function alliances, parallel 
development of new products, and cross-functional alliances. Desai (2000) studied how a 
high-demand manufacturer uses advertising, slotting allowances, and wholesale prices to 
signal high new product demand to retailers. The author also investigated the impact of a 
retailer's uncertainty on the effectiveness of a manufacturer's advertising 
 
2.4.4.5      Games with Joint Decisions on Inventory, Production/Pricing, and Other   
                 Attributes  
 
In many realistic problems, supply chain members encounter problems involving two or 
more decisions that must be made simultaneously. For example, Joint Inventory and 
Production or Pricing Decisions, Joint Inventory and Capacity Decisions, Joint 
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Production or Pricing and Capacity Decisions, Joint Production or Pricing and Service or 
Product Quality Decisions, Joint Production or Pricing, and Advertising or New Product 
Introduction Decisions. 
 
In conclusion, operations management has been slow to adopt game theory. Recently, an 
explosion of game theory papers in SCM has been witnessed, because SCM is an ideal 
candidate for the application of game theory. Even though the application of game theory 
to supply chain management is still in its infancy, much more progress will soon follow. 
For example, most of these papers utilize only a few game theoretic concepts; in 
particular, the concepts related to non-cooperative static games. The relative lack of 
game theory applications in SCM can be partially attributed to the absence of game 
theory courses in the curricula of most doctoral programs in operations research 
management. 
 
 
3.  Formulation and Methodology 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  THREE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Formulation and Methodology 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 38 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
FORMULATION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, we consider a vertical two-tier supply chain involving a manufacturer and 
a supplier. We create a model regarding the allocation of CSR to each member of a 
supply chain by dynamic Stackelberg game theory. We formulate the problem by 
choosing, in turn, both the supplier and the manufacturer as the leader of the game. To 
provide a clear explanation of our model, some crucial fundamental knowledge about this 
model is introduced in the next section. 
 
3.1     Foundation of the Model   
 
Game theory is not new in supply chain management. Table 3.1 shows the types of game 
theory that are often applied on supply chain management (The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics, 2008).  
 
 
Table 3.1 Types of Game Theory 
 
A1: Cooperative A2: Non-cooperative 
B1: Symmetric B2: Asymmetric 
C1: Zero-sum C2: Non-zero-sum 
D1: Simultaneous D2: Sequential 
E1: Perfect information E2: Imperfect information 
F1: Finitely F2: Infinitely 
G1: Discrete G2: Continuous 
H1: One-player H2: Many-player 
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Selecting the proper game model to formulate our problem is a key in determining 
whether the formulation is practical and whether a feasible solution is available. The 
following sections explain the criteria for choosing suitable game theory. 
 
3.1.1     Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The definition of CSR has been discussed and argued for several decades. Researchers 
have tried many ways to get a clear and robust definition of CSR. Three methodologies 
are often used. The first method is to derive an updated definition from literature review; 
the second is to interview businessmen and managers; the third is to interpret CSR 
through other theories, such as philosophy and economics. However, so far, no 
consensual definition is available. According to Carroll’s (1999) review of CSR 
definitions in academic literature, gathered through an extensive review of journal articles 
and web pages, 37 definitions of CSR had been found and analyzed. The definitions 
originated from 27 authors and covered a time span from 1980 to 2003. As Carroll points 
out, these definitions are divided into five dimensions, as listed in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2  Five Dimensions of Corporate Social Responsibility 
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Table 3.2 shows, in general, that CSR is defined as corporate activity and its impact on 
different social groups, which may be related to many issues including diversity, the 
environment, human rights, natural resources, and even stakeholder benefits. The 
dimensions 1-4 describe the features of the definition. The fifth dimension is 
voluntariness activities based on ethical values. The voluntariness dimension is the only 
CSR that is not prescribed by law; in other words, voluntary CSR is an arbitrary decision 
that companies make through their own will. Therefore, our model and formulation do 
not include the fifth dimension CSR. 
 
Furthermore, it is obvious that CSR is an abstract and fussy term. In order to ensure that 
CSR can be evaluated and allocated to each tier and that the optimal solution can be 
approached through the model, in our model, the firm’s capital is assumed to be the key 
essential element for taking social responsibility. Indeed, in reality, all forms of social 
responsibility, such as environmental protection, labor, ethnic issues, and technology 
updates, are involved in investment strategies. Since all kinds of CSR are simply 
expressed as investments, a long-term allocation of social responsibility among members 
of a supply chain vertical system can be derived from the firms’ investment shares over 
time. In this way, an abstract CSR can be estimated and computed in our formulation, and 
our model can be viewed as a long-term co-investment game model in supply chain social 
responsibility.  
 
3.1.2     Repeated Game with Complete Information 
 
The CSR issues included in dimensions 1-4 pertain to diversity, the environment, human 
rights, nature resources, and stakeholder benefits. Each of these issues is too complicated 
3.  Formulation and Methodology 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 41 
 
to be solved in the short-term; the resolution that a supply chain determines, thus, would 
be a long-term investment plan. Long-term investments are held for many years before 
investors realize reasonable returns. As a result, when the supply chain system has to 
assume certain CSR under regulations or policies, the game the firms in the supply chain 
play with one another crosses through multi-periods, which constitutes a repeated game.  
 
Moreover, in many real-life situations, a supply chain system that is stable enough to bear 
social responsibility normally already cooperates well and runs smoothly. The beliefs of 
members in the supply chain about each other are derived from past experiences of 
interacting with each other. That is, there may be certain things that an individual firm in 
a supply chain is willing to reveal to other members that are involved in long-term 
relationships with it, and other things that it intends to conceal (Myerson, 1991). For 
example, we might expect that an individual company would generally let other players 
know about its contributions toward taking social responsibility, but would try to 
maintain uncertainty about its cost and benefits.  
 
Taking those factors into account, we defined the model as a repeated game with 
complete information. Specifically, decisions are made numerous times, not just once, 
because after a stage game is played, the players again find themselves facing the same 
situation. The firms make decisions based on what they perceive about the future. Since 
players interact by playing a similar stage game, players have at least some information 
about the strategies chosen by others; thus, their play is contingent on past moves. 
 
3.1.3     Discrete-time Dynamic Game  
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In a repeated game, players’ moves depend continuously on time at all other points in 
time. It seems that a continuous dynamic game is a well-defined game for our model. As 
Myerson (1991) points out in his book ―Game Theory Analysis of Conflict,‖ in 
continuous time, the players can change from generosity to selfishness without there 
being any first point in time when someone was selfish. To avoid that, we must either 
somehow restrict the set of possible strategies for each player, or find a more 
sophisticated rule to define the realized outcome path for all pairs of possible strategies. 
Either way, this seems to be a difficult research problem (see Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991; 
Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975). 
 
A general approach in game theory is to work with discrete-time models. That is, we 
break up the continuous timeline into a countable sequence of intervals, each called a 
period (Myerson, 1991). We assume that each player can choose a new move only at the 
beginning of a period. We also define the length of a period as a year, which is long 
enough for players to respond to new information and change their decisions, so the 
discrete dynamic model can reasonably describe a real situation. 
 
3.1.4     Open-loop Stackelberg Game  
 
As mentioned in the literature review, there are many types of game theory that are often 
used to analyze problems of supply chain management. In a supply chain system, there 
are normally one or two members who are more powerful than the others, because they 
are the irreplaceable key parts in the chain (Bagchi, 1984). They might be a monopoly 
manufacturer, a supplier who has issued patents, or a successful retail chain. Indeed, it is 
not impossible for all firms in the supply chain to make decisions and take actions 
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simultaneously when the more powerful player has the advantage to take action first. 
Thus, in this model, to consider this realistic sequential game, we chose the Stackelberg 
game.  
 
In a typical two-player Stackelberg dynamic game, one player, the leader, chooses his 
actions before the other player, the follower. Each player's actions in the previous period 
of the repeated game are revealed to the other player before the next repetition.  
Importantly, the follower must have some information about the leader's choice; 
otherwise the difference in time would have no strategic effect (Basar & Olsder, 1999). 
 
Next, we explain why we define the Stackelberg game used in our model as open-loop, as 
opposed to close-loop. In a close-loop information structure, the result of an event or 
phenomenon in the past will influence an occurrence or occurrences of the same defined 
event or phenomenon in the present or future. Unlike a close-loop structure, open-loop 
information structure assumes that the players must formulate their decisions at time T 
only with knowledge of the initial condition of the state at time zero (Medanic & 
Radojevic, 1987). Since the actions in past periods are revealed to players in our dynamic 
game model with complete information, whether players make their current decisions for 
rest periods based on their observations on the opponent’s past actions or not, is another 
issue that must be clarified. Actually, after a supply chain system makes its long-term 
investment plan and starts the project toward bearing CSR,  it is more important for the 
players that the project is executed perfectly than how much CSR will be taken at the end 
of the game. This is mainly because they have already considered how much CSR will be 
taken due to the project and how many years the project will take when they make their 
long-term investment plan. Therefore, the players compute their input into a system using 
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only the current state and its model of the system; also, they do not use feedback to 
determine if its output has achieved the desired goal of the input. This means that the 
system does not observe the output of the processes that it is controlling and the players 
can credibly pre-commit their firms’ investment return plans at period zero for the entire 
game. This criterion quite matches the definition of an open-loop information structure. It 
is practicable to apply the open-loop Stackelberg game instead of the feedback 
Stackelberg game. Therefore, we define our Stackelberg dynamic game is an open-loop. 
 
3.2     Structure of the Model 
 
As we introduced previously, this model is a three-tier, multi-period, decentralized, and 
also non-integrated vertical control system supply chain network (Figure 3.1), in which 
each firm makes its decision in order to maximize its individual net profits. The network 
showed in Figure 3.1 is a typical regular supply chain system in the real world; this is also 
the supply chain system our model aims to solve. 
 
Figure 3.1 Structure of the Supply Chain that the Model Aims to Formulate  
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All retailers and suppliers at the same level are identical and symmetrical such that they 
make decisions simultaneously. In later sections of this thesis, we assume that only one 
supplier and one retailer are involved in playing the Stackelberg game as well as allocated 
social responsibility. The model is simplified as in Figure 3.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Simplified Version of Figure 3.1  
 
The manufacturer produces and supplies a single product at the same lot sale price to 
multiple retailers who then sell the product to dispersed and independent markets at 
uniform retail prices. To determine the uniform retail price and capture more consumer 
surplus, the manufacturer applies a two-part tariff price discrimination technique to its 
partially or fully monopolistic market. This thesis assumes that the manufacturer’s retail 
price is composed of two parts: a fixed retailers’ profit of per-unit sale in addition to a 
per-unit lot sale charge. Thus, Figure 3.3 is a simplified version of Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.3 Final Formulated Version of Figure 3.1  
 
The network shown by Figure 3.3 is the model we actually formulated, although in a real 
world situation, the formulation shown in Figure 3.1 would be the one used to solve the 
problem of a supply chain system. 
 
3.3      A general Formulation of Stackelberg Theory  
 
The Stackelberg game model has been extensively used to study dynamic optimization 
problems in supply chain management. A dynamic game has the following structure: (1) 
the state of the dynamic system at any time t is characterized by a set of variables called 
the state variables, (2) controls are to be decided by the game players, (3) the evolution of 
the state variables over time is described by a set of differential equations involving both 
state and control variables, and (4) each player has an objective function that he/she wants 
to maximize by his/her choice of decisions (Xiuli He, 2007). 
 
We solve an open-loop Stackelberg game by backward induction, which is to substitute 
the follower’s response function derived from solving the optimization problem of the 
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follower, given the leader’s response to the leader’s objection function. Secondly, in a 
vertical control system, it is impossible for all players to make decisions and take actions 
simultaneously, so the game should be played based on Stackelberg equilibrium rather 
than Nash equilibrium.  
 
He, Gutierrez, and Sethi (2007) illustrate a general model for a Stackelberg differential 
game involving two players playing the game over a fixed finite horizon, as detailed 
below. 
 
Objective function of the follower and its Hamiltonian function: 
 
            
      
0,
0(.)
( )
(0) 0
. ; . , ,
, , ,
t
t
R R
P
t
Max J X p w e X t w t r t dt
X F x t w t r t
X X
 



 
Where the function F represents the rate of sales,   is the follower’s discount rate, and 
0X  is the initial condition. The follower’s Hamiltonian 
 
( , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )R R R RH x r w x w r F x w r     
 
 
Where R   is the vector of the shadow prices associated with the state variable X; and it 
satisfies the adjoin equation 
 
( , , , )
( ) 0R RR R R
H x r w
T
x

  

  

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Here we have suppressed the argument t as is standard in the control theory literature, and 
we will do whenever convenient and when there arises no confusion in doing so. The 
necessary optimality condition for the follower’s problem satisfy 
 
*
( , , ) ( , , )
0 0
( , , )
R R
R
R
H x w r F x w r
r r r
get r x r



  
   
    
 
We assume that the Hamiltonian RH  is jointly concave in the variables X and r for any 
given w: Then above condition is sufficient for the optimality of r. From the necessary 
this condition, we derive the follower’s best response *( , , )Rr X w   
 
Objective function of the follower and its Hamiltonian function: 
     
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X F x w r x w
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H x r x w w
x
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
 
 





 



 
 
Where   is the leader’s discount rate and the above differential equations are obtained by 
substituting the follower’s best response *( , , )Rr X w  in the state equation and the adjoin 
equation of the follower respectively. We formulate the leader’s Hamiltonian 
 
 
( , ( , , ), , )
( , , , ( , , ), , ) ( , , ( , , )) R R RM M R R M R
H x r x w w
H x w r x w F x w r x w u
x
 
      

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
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Where M

 and   are the shadow prices associated with X and R

 respectively, and they 
satisfy the adjoint equations 
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( ) 0M T   and (0) 0   are the boundary conditions. 
 
Applying the concepts and algorithm of above general model built by He, Gutierrez and 
Sethi, we formulate our model in next section. 
 
3.4      Formulation 
 
When a supply chain system has to take some social responsibility due to regulations or 
policies, the firms in the supply chain system are conflicted between taking responsibility 
and maximizing their own benefit. The objective of our model is to maximize the profits 
of both players, along with maximizing the level of social responsibility taken by the 
supply chain system. The results of the model demonstrate whether the firms derive 
benefit from playing the games, and who should be the leader of the Stackelberg game. 
 
3.4.1     Assumptions  
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To ensure that the equilibrium of this model can be reached, some assumptions of the 
framework are made, as described below. 
 
 The market inverse demand function is ( )M t tP q a bq  (Mankiw, 2004);  retail 
price is determined by quantity. 
 
 In order to avoid losing market share in a monopolistic market, the manufacturer 
controls the downstream price to get out of double marginalization. Franchise fees or 
two-part tariffs are feasible ways to reach this goal (Tirole, 1988). We assume that 
the manufacturer extracts profit from retailers by franchise fees f; thus, we have the 
manufacturer’s lot sale price ( )
M
t t
P q a bq f   . 
 
 The supply chain network is decentralized, but is also vertically integrated due to 
monopoly, which is a necessary and sufficient condition to apply to the Stackelberg 
game in this model. 
 
 Although the decisions the players make cross through a whole year, firms often 
make their investment plan once in an account year; it is practical to formulate the 
problem using a discrete continuous time dynamic model instead of a differential one. 
 
 All kinds of social responsibility are assumed to be expressed as investment
tI .  
 
 All retailers and suppliers at the same level are identical and symmetrical such that 
they make decisions simultaneously, so that the model can be simplified to involve 
just one supplier and one retailer. 
 
 As a monopolist, the manufacturer determines its wholesale price, and controls the 
retail price, but cannot negotiate its purchasing price. The supplier controls the 
quality of parts or raw materials, and determines the technique level of the products. 
We, therefore, choose either the supplier or manufacturer to be the leader. 
 
 The state variable is the current social responsibility taken by the firms of the supply 
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chain system. It is a function of time and an accumulated amount of investment of the 
firms 
1 1 2 
S M
t t t tx x I I      . Here, 1
 is the rate of converting the supplier’s 
capital investment in CSR to the amount of CSR taken by the supply chain; while 
2  
is the rate of converting the Manufacturer’s capital investment in CSR to the amount 
of CSR taken by the supply chain. 
 
 Taking certain social responsibility is beneficial to firms. Functions
( )   ( )S t t M t tB x x andB x x    (Thomas, 1998) represent social benefit to the 
supplier and the manufacturer when social responsibility is taken by the supply 
chain system. 
 
 The government forces firms to take certain social responsibility through policies or 
regulations, but also encourages and rewards them for doing so. Below functions  
[1 ( )] S S S M
t t t t
T I I I    and [1 ( )]M M S Mt t t tT I I I     measure the values of the 
tax returns to the supplier and the manufacturer (Feibel,  2003). Both  and  are tax 
return policy parameters. Specifically,  is the rate of individual post tax return on 
investment (ROI), and  is rate of supply chain’s post tax return on investment (ROI). 
 
 A certain percentage of investment by the supplier is paid off by the manufacturer in 
various ways; for example, the manufacturer pays more to get environmentally 
friendly raw materials or parts from the supplier.  
 
 The goal of both the supplier and the manufacturer is to maximize their cumulated 
profits over the T periods with respect to their choice of output. 
 
 The game goes through finite periods, T. Generally, the payback period for long-term 
investment is ten years, so we set 10.T   
 
3.4.2      Notations and Definitions  
 
To formulate the model, we have provided the notations and definitions below. 
tx
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Variables 
t                  Period t 
T                Planning horizon  
tq       
Demand quantity at period t 
a                 Market potential 
b                 Price sensitivity 
f                 Franchise fee 
tx                State variable, degree of taking SR 
SH             Hamiltonian function of the followers 
MH            Hamiltonian function of the leader 
S
tJ              Objective function of the supplier 
M
tJ              Objective function of the manufacturer 
( )M tB x     Social benefit of the supplier 
( )S tB x      Social benefit of the manufacturer 
( )S tT x      Tax return of the supplier 
( )M tB x    Tax return of the manufacturer 
M
tI            The amount of investment of the manufacturer
 
S
tI               The amount of investment of the supplier
 
d                 The percentage of investment of the supplier payoff 
w                 Price of the supplier’s raw material  
                  Parameter of the supplier’s social benefit  
                  Parameter of the manufacturer’s social benefit  
                  Quantity discount parameter of the price of raw material 
                  Deteriorating rate of the level of current social responsibility 
                  The rate of individual post tax return on investment (ROI) 
                  The rate of supply chain’s post tax return on investment (ROI) 
1                 
The rate of converting the supplier’s capital investment in CSR to the amount of   
                      CSR taken by the supply chain
  
2                
The rate of converting the manufacturer’s capital investment in CSR to the  
                      amount of  CSR taken by the supply chain 
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Table 3.3   Notations and Definitions 
 
3.5    Mathematical Model: Case One 
 
In this thesis, the Stackelberg dynamic game is applied by selecting, in turn, either the 
supplier or the manufacturer as the leader. In fact, the supplier controls the quality of the 
parts or raw materials, and determines the technique level of the products; therefore, it 
may be as powerful as the manufacturer in implementing the allocation of investment into 
social responsibility. We formulated the situation in which the supplier is the leader in the 
Stackelberg game as case one. 
 
3.5.1   State Variable and Control Variables  
 
As any problem formulated as a dynamic game, this model has a state variable and 
control variables. We define the state variable as the level of social responsibility taken 
by companies, and the control variables are the capital amounts invested in taking social 
responsibility. Specifically, all of the social responsibility taken by firm j at period t can 
be expressed as investment  j
tI . The level of current supply chain investment in supply 
responsibility is 
tx ; therefore the accumulation of level of social responsibility taken by 
the firms is given by  
 
1 1 2
S M
t t t tx x I I       
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Where   is the deteriorating rate of the level of current social responsibility; 1  is the 
rate of converting the investment of the supplier to social responsibility; and 2

 is the 
rate of converting the investments of the supplier to social responsibility.
 
 
3.5.2     Objective Function and Constraints 
 
The objective functions of both the supplier and manufacturer attempt to optimize their 
net benefits. To do this, they need to minimize the cost of raw materials and investment in 
taking social responsibility, and maximize sale revenues and benefits from taking social 
responsibility as well as tax returns. In the model, the objective functions of the dynamic 
game cost function are made to depend only on the control vectors and the static variable. 
 
In our formulation, the profit function of the supplier at a single period is defined by the 
following equation: 
 
( ) ( , )S S S S S S Mt t t t t t t t t t tF Pq cq B x T I I I dI       
 
Where StP  
is the price of the product the supplier sells to the manufacturer; ( )St tB x  
is the 
social benefit of the supplier; and  ( , )S St t tT I I  
is the tax return of the supplier.  
,w and are parameters. Let StP w , 
2( )St t tB x x , and 
( , ) 1 ( )S S S S Mt t t t t tT I I I I I      . 
 
Thus, the objective function of the supplier is 
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1
2
1
arg max ( ) ( , )
arg max 1 ( )
T
S S S S S S M
t t t t t t t t t t t
i
T
S S M S M
t t t t t t t t
i
J P q cq B x T I I I dI
w q cq x I I I I dI  


     
         


 
 
Similarly, the profit function of the manufacturer at a single period is defined as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )M M S M M M Mt t t t t t t t tF P qq Pq B x T I I    
 
 
In the function, ( )
M
t tP q is the retail price of the product of the manufacturer; ( )
M
t tB x  
is 
the social benefit of the manufacturer; and ( , )M Mt t tT I I  is the tax return of the 
manufacturer.  Let ( )
M
t t t
P q a bq f    . 2( )M t tB x x ,  and 
( ) 1 ( )
M M M S M
t t t tT I I I I     . , , ,a b f and are parameters. 
 
Therefore, the objective function of the manufacturer is 
 
1
2
1
arg max ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 ( )
T
M M S M M M M
t t t t t t t t t
i
T
M S M M
t t t t t t t t
i
J P q q P q B x T I I
a bq f q Wq x I I I I  


    
          


 
 
3.5.3      Hamiltonian Function and Necessary Conditions 
 
Since we consider this dynamic game an optimal control problem, the Hamiltonian 
function is a practical way for us to find the equilibrium of the game (Sethi & Thompson, 
2000). 
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S
tFor fixed I , the Hamiltonian function of the manufacturer is defined by 
 
 
 
1 1 2
2
1 1 2( ) 1 ( )
M M M S M
t t t t t t
M S M M M S M
t t t t t t t t t t t t
H J P x I I
a bq f q wq x I I I I P x I I
  
     


   
             
 
This means, to any announced strategy StI of the leader, there is a unique optimal response 
of the follower M
tI  
, satisfying the following necessary conditions: 
 
1 21 ( ) 1 0
M
S M M Mt
t t t tM
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H
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Now, making the best unique decision, the supplier is faced with the optimal control 
problem. To obtain the Stackelberg strategy of the supplier, we maximize the objective 
function of the supplier by its Hamiltonian function. 
 
We fix the value of M
tI in constraint (1),  and then get the Hamiltonian function of the 
manufacturer:
 
 
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )S S S M
t t t t t t t
H J x P x u P      
 
S
tJ  
is the objective function of the supplier 
 
2 1 ( )S S S M S Mt t t t t t t t tJ wq cq x I I I I dI             
 
Substitute the value of MtI into the equation above. 
 
2
2
2 2 1 2 1 2
2
21 2 1
1 ( )
1 ( ) 1
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
( ) 1 1
( 1) ( ) (
2 2 2
S S S M S M
t t t t t t t t t
M S M S
S S S t t t t
t t t t t t
S M
St t t
t t t
J wq cq x I I I I dI
P I P d I
wq cq x I I I d
I P Pd
I wq x d
  
     
  
  
   
 

 
 
         
   
         
    
        
 
2 )
2
M
tcq



 
Substitute the value of 1tx  into 1 1( )
S
t tP x    .
 
 
  1 2 21 1 2 1 2 1
(1 )
( )
2 2
M
S S M S St
t t t t t t t
P
P x I I P x I
  
     


 
  
      
 
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Substitute the value of M
tP in constraint (3) into ( )
M
t tu P .
 
 
1( ) (2 )
M M
t t t t tu P u x P     
 
Consequently, the unique optimal response of the follower is determined from the 
equations below in conjunction with constraints (1) and (3). 
1 2 2
1 1
(1 )
( ) 0
2 2
S M
S St t
t tS
t
H P d
I P
I
  
  
   
    

 
 
2
1 1
1 2
( )
(1 ) 2
2
S
M t
S t
t
P
P d
I


 
 




  
 
          
(4)
 
 
Other constraints are, 
 
1 2 2
1 2 1
1
(1 )
( )
2 2
S M
St t
t t tS
t
H P
x I x
P
  
  




  
    
                                        
(5)
 
 
12 2
S
S St
t t t
t
H
P x P u
x
  

   

                                                                     
(6)
 
 
2
2 2
1 1
1
( )
2 2
S
S Mt
t t t tM
t
H
u I P u
P
 


 


    

                                                          
(7)
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12
M M
t t tP x P   
(3)
 
 
1 21
2
S M
M t t
t
I P
I
  

  
                   
(1)
 
 
The equilibrium point of the Stackelberg game is the solution of the objective function of 
the supplier corresponding to constraints (1) to (7). 
 
3.5.4      Augmented Discrete Hamiltonian Matrix 
 
There are many methods to solve the optimal control problem formulated in 3.4.4. We 
chose one of the most popular algorithms given by Medanic, which is an augmented 
discrete Hamiltonian matrix. 
 
First, we assume 
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 
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 11 12 11 12
1 1
1 21 22 2
t t t t
t t t t
S
t t
t t M
t t
t t
t t t
t t
x x Ax BP DA B D
C A EP P Cx AP E
x P
x P
u P
x xa a b b
x Ax BP D
u a a u b
 
 
 
 
 

 

        
                     
  
      
   

    
         
    
1 1
1 22 21
11 12 11 1 12 1 1
21 22 21 1 22 1 2
S
t
M
t
S M
t t t t
S M
t t t t
P d
b dP
a x a u b P b P d
a x a u b P b P d


 
 
    
     
    
    
       
 
 
Where A, B, and C are 2 × 2 matrices, and D is a 2 ×1 matrix.  
 
Based on the augmented Hamiltonian matrix and constraints (1) to (7), we can calculate 
the value of vector of matrices A, B, and D. 
11 12 21 22
0
, 0, 0,
0
a
a a a a A
a
 
 
       
 
            
And 
22
1
11
2
2 2 1
2 2 2
12 1
2
2 2 1
2 2 2
21 1
2
2 2 2
22
( )
2
3
( )
( ) 2( )
2 2 2 2
3
( )
( ) 1 2( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 4
b
b
b
b




 
  

  

 
  

  
  
 

 

      

     
    
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22 2
1 2 1
2
22 1
2
3
( ) ( )
2 2
2
3
( )
2
2 4
B
 
  
 

 

 

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
And 
     
   
 
 
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
22 2
2
2 2
1 1
2
1 ( ) ( )1 1 2 2( )
2 2 2 2
( 1) 11
2 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( )
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( 1) 1
2
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d
dd d
d
d
D
d
 
    

  
   
  
 
  

  

     
    
          

 
    
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
Similarly, we can get the value of matrices C and E:  
 
  111 12 11 12 11
21 22 21 22 21
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21 22 21 1 22 1 2
S S
t t t
t t tM M
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M S M
t t t t t
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


 
 
         
                  
         
      
            
 
11 12 21 22
,
2 2
2 , 2 , 2 , 0
2 0
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c c c c C
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
 
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And 
1 2
0
0, 0
0
e e E
 
     
 
 
 
3.5.5      Resolution  
 
We solve the tracking problem defined above by sweep method (see Bryson & Ho, 1975). 
First we assume a linear relation between tp  and tx ; thus, the optimal controls can then 
be determined at each time step based on the current estimated state.  
 
t t t tp S x g   
1 1
1
1 2 2 1 1( ) ( )
t t t
t t t t
x Ax Bp D
x I BS Ax Bg D
 

   
  

   
 
 
And 
 
1 1
1
1 2 2 1
1
1 2 2 1 1 1
( )
( ) ( )
t t t
t t t
t t t t t
p Cx Ap E
S C AS I BS A
g AS I BS Bg D Ag E
 

  

    
  

  
    
 
 
t tS and g are determined by the backward equations. The boundary condition suggests 
the following solution: 
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1
1 1
1 2 2 1 2 1
0
  
00
0 , 0
,
t
t t
t t
x
x p
S and g
S C and g E

   
   
    
  

 
 
 
 
We solve this problem by Matlab 7.0. Specifically, we get the different values of 
t tS and g at all points in time by backward loop; then get the corresponding values of 
tx  and tp  by forward loop. Following the value of  tx  and tp , we obtain the values of 
, , , ,S M S Mt t t t tx I I p p for all points in time.  
 
3.6      Mathematical Model:  Case Two 
 
In general, a monopolistic manufacturer determines its wholesale price, controls the retail 
price, and negotiates its purchasing price with the suppliers. Thus, the manufacturer has 
an advantage over the supplier to manage both downstream and upstream activities. This 
situation is considered to be case two. That is, the manufacturer is the leader of the game, 
while the supplier is the follower. 
 
The computation of case two is quite similar to case one. We omit the details and 
explanation here, and only list the results, as follows. 
 
3.6.1    Hamiltonian Function and Constraints of the Supplier  
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3.6.2      Hamiltonian Function and Constraints of the Manufacturer 
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3.6.3    Augmented Discrete Hamiltonian Matrix 
 
 
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The next chapter provides a numerical example of the results of these two cases.   
 
3.7       Summary 
 
In this chapter, a model for the allocation of CSR to members of a supply chain is 
described. It shows how CSR is evaluated as capital, and why game theory is necessarily 
applied to this model. The foundations of the model and the criteria for choosing the 
different game theories were previously explained in this thesis. The assumptions and 
notations of the model were explained and defined. An introduction to the Stackelberg 
game was also provided. Two formulations were provided, using either the supplier or the 
manufacturer as the leader of the game. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A CASE STUDY AND NUMERICL EXAMPLES 
 
In this chapter, we construct a numerical example in which both the manufacturer and 
supplier are forced by the government to take social responsibility for environmental 
protection. The regulation requires the members of the supply chain to use greater 
amounts of recycled materials in their packaging.  
 
4.1     the Background of the Companies and Organizations 
 
This numerical example focuses specifically on Ball Corporation, one of the largest 
producers of metal beverage cans in the world, its representative customer, Coca-Cola, 
and their requirements to meet the standards of the Aluminum Can Council (ACC). 
 
Ball Corporation operates more than 40 facilities in 10 countries. It manufactures rigid 
packaging products, primarily for foods and beverages, and supplies aerospace and other 
technology products and services to governmental and commercial customers. Ball 
manufactures approximately 45 billion recyclable aluminum and steel beverage cans 
annually; it also produces approximately 6.5 billion two and three-piece steel food cans 
each year in the U.S. and Canada and more than 5 billion PET bottles in the U.S. Through 
its joint ventures, Ball is one of the largest suppliers of aluminum cans in China.  
 
Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. (CCE) is the world’s largest marketer, distributor, and 
producer of products manufactured by Coca-Cola Inc. In 2006, CCE achieved total 
revenue of $19.8 billion, distributing 42 billion bottles and cans, 19 % of the Coca-Cola 
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Company’s volume worldwide. Operating in 46 states, Canada, and portions of Europe, 
CCE employs 74,000 people who operate 444 facilities, 55,000 vehicles and 2.4 million 
vending machines, beverage dispensers, and coolers.  
 
At the Coca-Cola Company, providing top-quality products and ensuring responsibility 
are the highest business objectives. Taking social responsibility is one of the promises 
that extend to all of its products. Coca-Cola emphasizes the importance of responsible 
policies and complies with local laws and regulations; to this end, it takes responsibility 
for holding its direct suppliers and bottling partners to standards no less than those 
required by applicable law.  
 
As in other global companies, Coca-Cola often takes social responsibility regarding 
environmental issues. To protect the environment, Coca-Cola has been working to 
advance technologies that allow them to use greater amounts of recycled materials in their 
packaging. Since introducing the first-ever beverage container with recycled PET in 1991, 
it has continued to make significant investments in the development of environmentally 
and economically viable recycling technologies. The Coca-Cola Company is using 
recycled content PET in more than 17 markets around the world. Recycling plastic for 
reuse yields financial benefits, requires less energy than producing bottles with virgin 
materials, and reduces waste and greenhouse gases. The most notable accomplishment is 
that more than half of the metal in Coca-Cola’s aluminum cans is recycled.  
 
The ACC is a joint effort between the Can Manufacturers Institute and the Aluminum 
Association.  The vision of the ACC is to be the voice of the aluminum can industry, to 
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promote and foster recycling solutions, to educate consumers and customers about the 
positive attributes of aluminum beverage cans, and to explore new markets for them.   
 
The aluminum can is the most recycled beverage package in the world and events like the 
America Recycles Day (ARD) Challenge are aimed at increasing the recycling rate and 
highlighting the sustainable benefits of aluminum beverage cans. The America Recycles 
Day Challenge continues to raise recycling awareness and reinforce the industry's 
commitment to sustainability and the environment, and support local businesses and 
charities in the community.  
 
4.2      Description of the Problem 
 
In this section, we describe the problem facing Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola in the 
year 2000. As commonly known, Ball Corporation distributes a wide range of branded 
can products. These products are sold to Coca-Cola worldwide. Thirty years ago, the 
beverage can market was dominated by three-piece tinplate steel cans. Throughout the 
1970s, steel battled aluminum for this market. Although steel is cheaper than aluminum, 
the aluminum can defeated the steel can for some of its obvious attributes. The aluminum 
can is the fastest chilling beverage container and is very effective at maintaining the fizz 
of the beverage until it is opened. Other advantages include allowing more efficient use of 
shelf space, cost, filling speed, and the ability to advertise right on the can.  
 
However, the main reason steel cans were replaced with aluminum is, except for being 
recycled indefinitely without losing any of their properties, aluminum cans contain more 
than 51% recycled content, which is much more than any other beverage container 
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material. With the advent of environmentalism and the energy crisis, aluminum had new 
allies in deposit legislation and in recycling. Because of the inherent value of recycled 
aluminum cans to aluminum companies, distributors and canners pressed makers for 
more aluminum cans to help cover collection and accounting costs in deposit states. 
Aluminum companies, led by Reynolds Metals (Richmond, VA) and Alcoa, created 
recycling programs that educated consumers that recycling aluminum cans back into new 
cans saves energy. Under pressure from the government and organizations, beverage 
supply chain firms considered the use of recycled aluminum cans as a necessary way to 
take social responsibility for the environment and a sustainable society.  
 
Currently, most metal beverage cans made in the United States are manufactured from 
aluminum, whereas in some parts of Europe and Asia approximately 55% are made of 
steel and 45% from aluminum alloy. It was inevitable that Ball Corporation and Coca-
Cola would switch from steel to aluminum alloy cans.  
 
4.3     Application of the Model 
 
The soft drink manufacturing industries have had a relatively stable market share in 
recent years. According to statistics, the market share of Coca-Cola is 42.7%, while 30.8% 
of the market share belongs to Pepsi; the other 16.5% of the market belongs to the Dr. 
Pepper Snapple Group (Dr. Pepper, 7UP, Snapple, Schweppe's).  
 
Between Coca-Cola and Pepsi, the market share is so large and stable that they are often 
considered a classic duopoly study and analysis case. Since there is almost no difference 
between the production costs of Coca-Cola and Pepsi, this principal duopoly model is a 
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Cournot duopoly—a duopoly based on quantity competition. It is reasonable that the 
companies of a Cournot duopoly are viewed as a monopoly in their own market share 
range when their respective market shares remain unchanged for long period of time. 
Therefore, Coca-Cola can be considered the monopoly manufacturer of the model in this 
numerical example. 
 
Ball Corporation is one of the world's leading suppliers of rigid metal packaging products 
and services, primarily to the beverage and food industries. In its mission to accelerate 
aluminum can replacement, Ball Corporation is involved in more matters than Coca-Cola. 
Ball Corporation negotiates with aluminum mills and suppliers, innovates their 
production lines, communicates with the ACC and other organizations, and updates its 
technology to increase aluminum can recycling rates. It is obvious that Ball Corporation 
can be the leader in the Stackelberg game. 
 
Both Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola are powerful in the metal packaging and soft drink 
industries. The supply chain network in which they exist is decentralized.  
 
4.4      The Numerical Examples 
 
It is difficult to parameterize this model because of a lack of precise data and because of 
its high-level of abstraction. This section provides rationales that we hope yield parameter 
values that are the right order of magnitude (detailed in Table 4.1). Certain parameters are 
varied to explore the sensitivity of the conclusions with respect to those values. 
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Parameter             Interpretation of the parameter                                                     Value 
a             Market potential                                                                       6 
b             Price sensitivity                                                                            0.00001 
qt                  Annual demand quantity                                                                                100000 
f             Franchise fee                                                                                          0.5 
T            Planning horizon            10 
D           The percentage of investment of the supplier payoff                               0.5 
c            The price of aluminum                                                                             2.4        
w           The price of an aluminum can                                 3.6 
           Parameter of social benefit to the supplier                                                           0.1 
           Parameter of social benefit to the manufacturer                                               0.2 
           Quantity discount parameter of the price of the raw material                             0               
           Deteriorating rate of the level of current social responsibility                         0.9 
           Rate of individual post tax return on investment (ROI)                         0.2 
           Rate of supply chain’s post tax return on investment (ROI)                          0.001 
1          Rate of converting the supplier’s capital to CSR                                                0.9 
2         Rate of converting the manufacturer’s capital to CSR                                      0.9 
 
Table 4.1 Rationales  
 
The parameter that is the easiest to interpret is the tax return rate  . It is common in 
policy to assume that firms are able to apply an annual tax return of 5 to 20% of their 
revenue. We take the high end of this range  = 0.2 to show that the government is eager 
to encourage Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola to replace steel cans with aluminum cans.                                                                     
 
Parameters a and b are also easy to define. We assume the annual sale of a can product is 
100,000 cases, that is  100000tq  . The inverse demand function 
( )t tp q a bq  is a 
function that maps the quantity of output demanded to the market price for that output. 
The price function is different in terms of types of retailer. Here, we just consider 
supermarkets whose sales account for over 80% of Coca-Cola’s annual sales. The average 
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wholesale price (without promotions) of Coca-Cola to supermarkets is $5 per case; if the 
lot sale price is increased to $6, customers will switch to buying other brands or drinks. 
Thus, we can easily derive the value for parameters  6 0.00001a and b  . Coca-Cola 
controls the retail price to get out of double marginalization, match its sale strategies, and 
compete with Pepsi. It lets supermarkets make $0.5 for the sale of one case of can product. 
We set  0.5f  .  
 
The parameters 
( )S t tB x x and ( )
M
t tB x x are the potential benefits Ball 
Corporation and Coca-Cola obtain from using aluminum cans, such as increased demand, 
better reputation, rewards from some organizations, and so on. and  are percentages 
of the current sum of the firms’ investment to take social responsibility. We set
0.1 0.2and   .  
 
Any investment deteriorates by 5 to1 5% each year due to inflation. We set 0.1  here. 
A long-term investment plan normally lasts ten years. We assume that the time horizon is 
10T  . 
 
We chose the average price of raw aluminum material ($0.1/can) and an aluminum can 
($0.15/can) in the metal packing industry according to Ball Corporation’s purchase price 
for aluminum and the price of the aluminum can that Ball Corporation sells to Coca-Cola. 
This turns out to be 2.4 3.6c and w  . Coca-Cola’s investment to switch to aluminum 
cans can be used to train workers, update production lines, or pay increased costs incurred 
in the production of the aluminum cans. The percentage of investment that Coca-Cola 
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pays to Ball Corporation for the difference between aluminum cans and steel cans is 
represented by  d . We set 0.5d  here. 
 
4.5      A static Numerical Example of the Model  (T=1) 
 
In this section, a static numerical example is given to allocate the amount of investment in 
aluminum can replacement to Coca-Cola and Ball Corporation in the first round.  
 
In this example, we first assume that the supplier, Ball Corporation, is the leader; the 
manufacturer, Coca-Cola, is the follower. This corresponds to case one in Chapter Three. 
In case one, the Ball Corporation, as a Stackelberg leader, decides the amount of its 
investment in the project based on maximizing its net profit at period one, taking into 
account Coca-Cola’s expected sales at the first stage. At the second stage, Coca-Cola, 
acting as a Stackelberg follower, decides its investment amount after the manufacturing 
department’s decision is given. Then, we assume that Coca-Cola is the leader and Ball 
Corporation is the follower. This corresponds to case two in Chapter Three. All 
conditions and settings in case two are the same as those in case one. 
 
We apply a backward reduction to show the result of the Stackelberg game at first round, 
T=1. That is, we first anticipate the follower’s best response to any announced investment 
plan from the leader. The anticipation is derived from solving the optimization problem 
of the follower, given the leader’s investment plan. We then substitute the follower’s 
response function into the leader’s problem and solve for the leader’s optimal investment 
plan. This investment plan of the leader, together with the retailer’s best response to that 
plan, constitutes Stackelberg equilibrium for the aluminum can replacement.  
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4.5.1     Problem Formulation and Computation  (Case One) 
 
In case one, Ball Corporation is the Stackelberg leader, while Coca-Cola is the 
Stackelberg follower. Their profit functions are similar to those described in Chapter 
Three. 
 
( ) ( , )S S S S S S Mt t t t t t t t t t tF P q cq B x T I I I dI                                                      (1)
 
 
The above function maximizes the profit of Ball Corporation, the supplier. S
tP  
is the 
price of the supplier; ( )St tB x  is the social benefit to the supplier, and ( , )
S S
t t tT I I is the tax 
return of the supplier. Let S
tP w , 
2( )St t tB x x , and  ,w and   are parameters, 
( , ) 1 ( )S S S S Mt t t t t tT I I I I I      . 
 
( ) ( ) ( )M M S M M M Mt t t t t t t t tF P q q P q B x T I I                                    (2) 
 
This function maximizes the profit of Coca-Cola, the manufacturer.
 
( )Mt tP q  
is the retail 
price of the manufacturer’s product; ( )Mt tB x is the manufacturer’s social benefit;
( , )M Mt t tT I I is the manufacturer’s tax return; and  ,w and  are parameters; let 
( )Mt t tP q a bq f   ,
2( )M t tB x x , ( ) 1 ( )
M M M S M
t t t tT I I I I      . 
 
We substitute T=1 into functions (1) and (2) to get the objective functions of Ball 
Corporation and  Coca-Cola, below:  
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2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   ( ) 1 ( )
S S S S M S MMax F P c q x I I I I dI                                  (3) 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1   ( ) 1 ( )
M M S M MMax F a bq f q x I I I I                                  (4) 
 
Coca-Cola, acting as a Stackelberg follower, decides its investment amount by optimizing 
its profits at period one, given the Ball Corporation’s investment plan. 
 
For given fixed 
1
SI , the first derivative of 1( )
M M
tF I is 
 
1 1 1 1
* 1
1
1 ( ) 1 0
1
( )
2
M S M M
S
M
I I I I
I
I
  
 

      

 

 
 
Substituting this optimal * 1
1
1
( )
2
S
M II
 

 
  into the function of 1( )
S S
tF I , 
 
2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) 1 ( )
2 2
S S
S S S S SI IF P c q x I I I d
   
  
 
    
        
 
 
 
Then taking first order, we get 
 
*
1
1
1
2 2( )S
d
I



 

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We substitute the values of the other parameters in rationales into the above profit 
functions to get the values of 
*
1( )
MI
and 
*
1( )
SI
 
 
* 3
1( ) 6.5 10
SI    
* 3
1( ) 1.25 10
MI  
 
 
We then substitute the values of the other parameters in rationales and the values of 
*
1( )
MI
and 
*
1( )
SI
into the above profit functions to get the value of the objective functions 
of
 Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola as represented below: 
 
 
5
1 1 1 1
* 5
1
(3.6 2.4) 1 0.1 1 0.001( ) 0.4
( ) 1.196875 10
S S S M S M
t t
S
F I I I I I
F
            

 
 
 
5
1 1 1 1
* 4
1
 (6 1 0.5 3.6) 1 0.1 1 0.001( )
( ) 8.98 10
M M S M M
t
M
Max F I I I I
F
            

 
 
 
4.5.2      Problem Formulation and Computation  (Case Two) 
 
In case two, Coca-Cola is the Stackelberg leader, while Ball Corporation is the 
Stackelberg follower. We repeat the computation as in case one, to obtain the solution of 
the optimization problem for case two, as shown below: 
 
* 3
1( ) 2.25 10
SI    
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* 3
1( ) 4.5 10
MI    
* 5
1( ) 1.2129375 10
SF    
* 4
1( ) 8.94375 10
MF    
 
4.5.3    Solution Analysis of the Static Example  
 
We compare the above results with the output of the Matlab 7 code. This comparison is 
shown in Table 4.2. 
 
T=1 IM IS FM FS resource 
case one 1250 6500 89800 119687.5 calculated by hand 
case one 1250 6500 89843.75 119687.5 output of Matlab 7 
case two 4500 2250 88987 121293.75 calculated by hand 
case two 4500 2250 88987.5 121293.75 output of Matlab 7 
 
Table 4.2  Comparison of manually calculated results and the Matlab output 
 
From Table 4.2, it is evident that there is little difference between the optimal solutions 
for the profits of Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola calculated manually and the output of 
Matlab. There is no difference between their optimal CSR investment plans. 
 
4.6    A dynamic Numerical Example of the Model  (T=10) 
 
In this section, we draw the results of the equilibrium from our modeling, two-stage 
Stackelberg dynamic games. In the model, the strategies available at each period are the 
amount of investment made in using aluminum cans and recycling. The equilibrium is 
4.  A Case Study and Numerical Examples 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 81 
 
valid when each player's predicted strategy is its best response to the predicted strategies 
of the other players. 
 
In a Stackelberg game, the first move gives the leader a crucial advantage. There is also 
the important assumption of perfect information in the Stackelberg game; the follower 
must observe the quantity chosen by the leader. If the follower cannot observe the leader's 
move, it is no longer rational for the follower to choose. However, it must be that there is 
imperfect information and the follower is unable to observe the leader's move because it 
is irrational for the follower not to observe if possible, once the leader has moved. If the 
leader can observe, it will, so that it can make the optimal decision. 
 
We first assume that the supplier, Ball Corporation, is the leader of the game. Ball 
Corporation is forced by policies or regulations to only supply aluminum cans to Coca-
Cola. Coca-Cola has to pay more to purchase aluminum cans rather than steel cans, 
modify its production lines and machines for the much lighter weight aluminum cans, 
update its recycling management, and replace wooden pallets with plastic pallets. 
Specifically, Ball Corporation announces the amount of investment S
tI to Coca-Cola with 
the purpose of optimizing its own expected profit, given Coca-Cola’s best response. 
Coca-Cola decides its amount of investment M
tI in order to maximize its own expected 
profit. 
 
We can also assume the manufacturer, Coca-Cola, is the leader of the game. Similarly, 
Coca-Cola is forced by policies or regulations to only purchase aluminum cans from Ball 
Corporation. Ball Corporation has to negotiate with new raw material suppliers, 
aluminum mills, modify its new production lines, and train employees. Similar to the first 
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case, Coca-Cola announces the amount of its investment M
tI to Ball Corporation with the 
purpose of optimizing its own expected profit, given Ball Corporation’s best response. 
Ball Corporation decides the amount of its investment S
tI in order to maximize its own 
expected profit.  
 
Equilibrium can be established when the leader moves first and the follower moves 
second. In this structure, equilibrium can be deducted by using backwards induction, in 
which we solve the second stage in advance, given the outcome from the first stage. 
 
4.7      Solutions Analysis  (T=10)  
 
In this section, we discuss the results of the Stackelberg game played by Ball Corporation 
and Coca-Cola. The three key criteria to be considered are the profits of both companies, 
the amount of investment, and the level of social responsibility taken by the supply chain. 
 
4.7.1     Profits Analysis 
 
The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to analyze the total net profits and the objective 
functions of Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola gained in the game over time. How do Ball 
Corporation and Coca-Cola make decisions and take actions to follow the policies and/or 
regulations? Since we assume that all players seek to gain maximum profits, profit 
analysis would be carried out in order to answer the original questions.   
 
The profits of Coca-Cola and Ball Corporation, when Ball Corporation is the leader of the 
game, are illustrated by Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Profits of Ball Corporation and Coco-Cola in Case One  
 
The graph shows the trend of Coca-Cola and Ball Corporation’s profits from periods one 
to ten in a Stackelberg game in which Ball Corporation is the leader. The profits of Ball 
Corporation noticeably decrease by 50% in the first three years and appear quadri-curve 
during period four to ten. The profits of Coca-Cola decrease sharply by more than ten 
times in the first four periods, and then remain almost unchanged at about one million 
dollars.  
 
The profits of Coca-Cola and Ball Corporation, when Coca-Cola is the leader of the game, 
are illustrated by Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Profits of Ball Corporation and Coco-Cola in Case Two 
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The leader, Coca-Cola, does not make a profit in the first year, and shows a slight 
increase in profits in both the second and third years. From period four to ten, Coca-
Cola’s profits dramatically increase and then decrease and appear quadri-curve. The 
profits of Ball Corporation smoothly decrease in the first three years, and then remain 
stable until period ten. 
 
4.7.2      Investments Analysis 
 
The investments of Coca-Cola and Ball Corporation, when Ball Corporation is the leader 
of the game, are shown, over time, by Figure 4.3, below. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Investments of Ball Corporation and Coco-Cola in Case One 
 
As the leader of the game, Ball Corporation derives benefits from Coca-Cola, and does 
not actually take any money from its own funds to invest in the aluminum project during 
the first three years. To keep the game going, Ball Corporation invests in the project by 
millions each year for the remaining seven years. Meanwhile, as the follower in the game, 
Coca-Cola makes large investments in the project in the first three years. Subsequently, 
its investment in and benefit from the project tend to balance out. 
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Figure 4.4 Investments of Ball Corporation and Coco-Cola in Case Two 
 
Similarly, as shown by Figure 4.4, when Coca-Cola is the leader of the game, the 
replacement of steel cans does not impact its net profit for the first three years. From the 
fourth year, Coca-Cola spends hundreds of thousands of dollars on the project each 
period. In contrast, the follower pays for the project in the first two years, but its net profit 
decreases in the long run due to the use of aluminum cans over the next eight years. 
 
4.7.3      Social Responsibility Analysis 
 
Another key criterion we analyze is the social responsibility of the project. In fact, in the 
game, what governments, organizations, and even society is concerned about is how 
much social responsibility is taken by the supply chain system. 
 
Since we estimate the social responsibility taken by Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola by 
investment, the level of social responsibility taken via replacing steel cans with aluminum 
ones could be discussed and demonstrated by examining Figures 4.5 and 4.6. 
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Figure 4.5 Level of Corporate Social Responsibility in Case One 
 
 
The above figure shows the changes in social responsibility taken by Ball Corporation 
and Coca-Cola during the game in which Ball Corporation is the leader. The level of 
social responsibility taken by both Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola keep steadily 
increasing with time. To show the property of the curve, we add a trend line and its 
equation to the curve. 
 
For the other case in which Coca-Cola is the leader of the game, the curve expressing the 
level of social responsibility taken, the trend line, and its equation are shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Level of Corporate Social Responsibility in Case Two 
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4.8       Comparison of the Two Cases  (T=10)  
 
We analyzed the results of the two cases in terms of three criteria: profits, the amount of 
investment, and the level of social responsibility taken by the supply chain. A comparison 
of the two cases will reveal which case has more advantage over the other. 
 
4.8.1     Motivation Analysis 
 
Although Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola have to replace steel cans with more expensive 
and softer aluminum cans, they still pursue maximum net profit under the circumstance. 
Profit is the key reason they play a long-term game in implementation of the policy. We 
compare the profits of Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola over a time horizon, first playing 
the game and then, without playing the game.  
 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8, below, show a comparison for the first case in which Ball 
Corporation is the leader of the game.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of the Supplier’s Profit, Playing Game One and Without Playing Game 
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Figure 4.8 Comparison of the Manufacturer’s Profit, Playing Game One and Without Playing Game 
 
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the difference in Ball Corporation’s profits when playing the 
game and without playing. JSO is Ball Corporation’s profit without playing the game; JS 
is their profit when playing the game with Coca-Cola. As in the first graph, the second 
one shows the difference in Coca-Cola’s profits. Obviously, both companies gain extra 
profit from playing the games. 
 
The next two figures show the comparison for the second case, in which Coca-Cola is the 
leader of the game.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 Comparison of the Supplier’s Profit, Playing Game Two and Without Playing Game 
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Figure 4.10 Comparison of the Manufacturer’s Profit, Playing Game Two and Without Playing Game 
 
In Figure 4.9, it is apparent that playing the game is beneficial to Ball Corporation in the 
first year, but that Ball Corporation’s profits with playing the game is less than without 
the game. The difference between JS and JSo remains relatively stable in the last five 
years. Unlike Ball Corporation, in Figure 4.10, Coca-Cola, the leader, increases its profits 
from the second year by playing the game with its supplier.  
 
In sum, for the first case, in which the supplier is the leader of the game, both the supplier 
and manufacturer are motivated to play the game because their benefits are increased; 
however, for the second case, in which the manufacturer is the leader, the supplier might 
have less motivation as it loses money by playing the game. 
 
4.8.2      Profits Analysis 
 
Now, we compare the profits gained by Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola in case one and 
case two, respectively. In Figures 4.11 and 4.12, JS1 and JS2 are the benefits of the 
supplier made in case one and in case two; similarly, JM1 and JM2 are the benefits of the 
manufacturer made in case one and in case two. 
-5.00E+08
0.00E+00
5.00E+08
1.00E+09
1.50E+09
2.00E+09
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
JM
JMO
4.  A Case Study and Numerical Examples 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 90 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Comparison of  the Supplier’s Profit in Case One and Case Two 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Comparison of  the Manufacturer’s Profit in Case One and Case Two 
 
Clearly, the profits of both Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola in case one are much greater 
than in case two. It is obvious to conclude that the benefits to the supplier, the 
manufacturer, and the entire supply chain are increased when the supplier is the leader in 
a Stackelberg game. 
 
4.8.3      Social Responsibility Analysis 
 
We also discuss the difference between case one and case two in the amount of social 
responsibility taken by the supply chain.  
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Figure 4.13 Trend Line of the Level of CSR in Case One 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Trend Line of the Level of CSR in Case Two 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Comparison of the Level of CSR in Case One and Case Two 
 
In Figures 4.13 and 4.14, curve one stands for the level of social responsibility in case one, 
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more social responsibility taken by the companies in case one, but also that the growth 
rate of the level of social responsibility as time goes on is larger in case one than in case 
two. In other words, the goal of making the supply chain take more social responsibility is 
better achieved when the supplier is the leader of the game. Based on this dynamic 
numerical example, we easily draw the conclusion that Aluminum Can Council should let 
Ball Corporation be the leader to implement the project if the level of CSR taken by 
companies is only concerned about, because more CSR is borne by the beverage supply 
chain. This conclusion might be helpful for regulator to make their policies, because the 
amount of CSR taken by supply chains is the one of the key criteria about which 
governments and consumers concern. Moreover, this conclusion leads to an important 
managerial insight. That is, when governments release policies to regulate some social 
issues by forcing supply chains to involve in, it would be better if they make the content 
of policies in terms of the needs of Ball Corporation for a better performance. 
 
4.8.4      Investment Analysis 
 
The amount of investment Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola make in the ten years in each 
case is considered, illustrated by the figures below.  
 
 
Figure 4.16 Comparison of Total Investment in Case One and Case Two 
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In graph 4.15, curve one I1 stands for the total investment made by Ball Corporation and 
Coca-Cola in case one. It can be seen that the companies spent much more money on 
social responsibility in case one than in case two.  
 
4.9      Summary 
 
This chapter presented a numerical example. That is, Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola had 
to replace their steel cans with aluminum under a new regulation released by the ACC. 
We studied two different cases: In case one the supplier was chosen as the leader of the 
game; while in case two, the manufacturer was the leader. We analyzed the results of the 
two cases in terms of three criteria: profits, the amount of investment, and the level of 
social responsibility taken by the supply chain. According to the above analysis, 
Aluminum Can Council should let Ball Corporation be the leader to push other 
companies in the beverage supply chain to replace steel cans in channels by aluminum 
cans. The reasons are listed as below. Firstly, unlike case two, both the supplier and 
manufacturer had motivation to play the games because their benefits definitely increased 
in the first case; secondly, the profits of both Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola were much 
greater in case one than in case two;  thirdly, the goal to make the supply chain take more 
CSR was better achieved by the game played in case one. This conclusion can be applied 
to other cases as long as the assumptions we make for the numerical are satisfied. For 
examples, the manufacturer is or can be viewed as a monopoly, and the supplier is as 
powerful as the manufacturer so that both of them can be the leader of the game. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS 
 
In this section, we examine the experimental parameters used in the numerical solutions 
for the model, and then analyze these results to obtain insights into the contract properties 
for industrial practice. Based on the meanings and properties of the parameters, 
sensitivity analysis is conducted for parameters in three groups: time horizon parameters
T ; tax return parameters of ( )M tT x and ( )
S
tT x , which are and  ; and the social 
benefit parameters of ( )M tx  and ( )
S
tx , which are and  .  
 
5.1      Sensitivity Analysis of the Conclusion to Parameter T  
 
We first consider the parameter of T  (the time horizon). In the numerical example, we let 
10T   to illustrate how social responsibility is allocated over time by a dynamic 
Stackelberg game. As noted in Chapter Three, ten years is the maximum horizon for most 
company projects. Therefore, parameter T is selected from 1 to 10. To correspond with 
the other fixed parameters, the results of the sensitivity analysis of parameter T are shown 
in Figures 5.1 through 5.5.  
 
 
Figure 5.1   Sensitivity of X to T  
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Figure 5.1 shows the trends of the state variable X for both cases.  It is easy to understand 
that the level of social responsibility taken by the supply chain accumulates as time goes 
by. We also find that, in case one, both the value of X and the growing rate of X over 
time are higher than those in case two. As a result, we easily interpret that the supply 
chain system bears more social responsibility when the supplier is the leader rather than 
the manufacturer. The result also demonstrates that the time horizon doesn’t impact the 
above conclusion. We then compare the profits of the manufacturer and supplier with the 
time only contract. Those results are illustrated by Figures 5.2 and 5.3.    
 
 
Figure 5.2   Sensitivity of  JS to T 
 
 
Figure 5.3    Sensitivity of JM to T 
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the JS in case one generally larger than the corresponding JS in case two, which means no 
matter how many periods the game lasts, the manufacturer makes more profit from being 
the leader of the game. On the other hand, Figure 5.3 shows that being the leader of the 
game does not guarantee that the manufacturer’s profits will increase. Specifically, from 
the seventh year, the profits of the manufacturer, when it is leader, are lower than when it 
is not. Therefore, the time sensitivity factor has a significant impact on the manufacturer’s 
decision as to whether it wants to be the leader of the game. 
 
Next, we analyze the sensitivity of the time horizon to the investments of the 
manufacturer and the supplier. 
 
 
Figure 5.4    Sensitivity of IS to T 
 
 
Figure 5.5    Sensitivity of IM to T 
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In Figure 5.4, the amount of the supplier’s investment increases steeply as time goes by 
when it is the leader, while the supplier makes its investments steadily over time when it 
is the follower. Figure 5.5 indicates that the manufacturer significantly raises the amount 
of its investment in both cases. In sum, the raised rate of investment can be attributed 
primarily to parameters. 
 
5.2      Sensitivity Analysis of the Conclusion to Parameters and   
 
This section examines how the tax return sensitivity factors and  , the parameters of 
the tax return, affect the results of the game. We examine the sensitivities of and   to 
the state variable X, profits JM and JS, and investment IM and IS, respectively.  
 
First, we consider the state variable X. In Figure 5.6 and 5.7, below, we compare the 
profits with that of the  only contract. For both cases, the level of the state variable in 
the higher tax returns policy is generally larger than in the lower one. Specifically, X 
increases gradually as and  increase; we also observe that when  is greater than 
0.15, the X starts to rise rapidly, while when  is between 0.01 and 0.15, the value of X 
increases only slightly. Similarly, plotting the numerical results in Figure 5.7, we see that 
the rate of growth of X suddenly increases after  reaches the point of 0.005. 
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Figure 5.6    Sensitivity of X to  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7    Sensitivity of X to  
 
Furthermore, we examine the profits of the manufacturer and the supplier, JM and JS.  
Figures 5.8 through 5.11 show the sensitivity of and  to the profits of the 
manufacturer and the supplier. The changes of profits of the two players along with the 
increasing tax return policy are quiet similar to the state variable X, as previously 
discussed; the rate of growth of JM and JS suddenly increases when is greater than 0.15 
and  is larger than 0.005. However, there is an exception–the impact of and  to the 
profit of the supplier is not as strong as that of the manufacturer when the supplier is the 
follower in the game. In that situation, the profit of the supplier steadily changes. 
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Figure 5.8   Sensitivity of JM to  
 
 
Figure 5.9   Sensitivity of JM to   
 
 
Figure 5.10  Sensitivity of JS to   
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Figure 5.11  Sensitivity of JS to  
 
The splitting of the investment in social responsibility between the manufacturer and the 
supplier with parameter and  is also illustrated in Figures 5.12 through 5.15. Similar 
to the JS and JM, both IM and IS increase as the tax return policy improves. In particular, 
the amount of the manufacturer’s investment in both cases and the amount of the 
supplier’s investment in case one start increasing drastically as the value of  becomes 
larger than 0.15 and the value of   becomes greater than 0.005; the amount of the 
supplier’s investment in case two continues to increase steadily. 
 
 
Figure 5.12    Sensitivity of IM to   
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Figure 5.13    Sensitivity of IM to   
 
 
Figure 5.14    Sensitivity of IS to   
 
 
Figure 5.15    Sensitivity of IS to   
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easily explained as the higher the tax return, resulting in increased profits, the more 
investments the manufacturer and supplier would make. When the tax return parameters 
reach certain critical points, the two players would make more aggressive investments in 
social responsibility due to their significant profit gain. 
 
With respect to industrial management, governments can set the tax return policies at 
minimum values of    0.01,0.15 0.0001,0.005and    to collect more tax from the 
manufacturer and the supplier, because in the range of the state variable X, profits JM and 
JS and investments IM and IS are not really sensitive to the rates of and   . Moreover, 
it is a good strategy for governments to adjust high tax return policies such as 
0.15 0.005and    in order to accelerate the motivation of the two players to take 
CSR. 
 
5.3      Sensitivity Analysis of the Conclusion to Parameters and   
 
In this section, we analyze the effect of and  , and the social benefits of the supplier 
and the manufacturer, on X, JM/JS, and IM/IS.  
 
First, we examine the state variable X.  According to Figures 5.16 and 5.17, for case one 
in which the supplier is the leader of the game, the value of X is in direct ratio to  , the 
parameter of social benefits of the supplier, and in inverse ratio to  , the parameter of 
social benefits of the manufacturer. In contrast, when the manufacturer is the leader, X is 
in direct ratio to  , the parameter of social benefits of the supplier, and in inverse ratio to 
 . This implies that increasing the social benefit parameter of the follower or decreasing 
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the social benefit parameter of the leader leads to a higher level of social responsibility. 
This phenomenon can be explained as the follower bears more risk with its increasing 
investment in social responsibility.  
 
 
Figure 5.16    Sensitivity of X to   
 
 
 
Figure 5.17    Sensitivity of X to   
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are the follower in the game, their profits dramatically increase with the increase of their 
own social benefit parameter. This observation fits the fact that the leader appropriates the 
follower’s share of channel profit when the social benefit the leader gains from the project 
has a tendency toward growth.  
 
 
Figure 5.18   Sensitivity of JM to   
 
 
 
Figure 5.19    Sensitivity of JM to   
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Figure 5.20  Sensitivity of JS to   
 
 
 
Figure 5.21  Sensitivity of JS to   
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Figure 5.22   Sensitivity of IM to  
 
 
Figure 5.23    Sensitivity of IM to   
 
 
Figure 5.24   Sensitivity of IS to   
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Figure 5.25    Sensitivity of IS to   
 
 
The above discussion shows that the government should let the manufacturer be the 
leader of the game if the supplier is the one that can obtain more social benefits from the 
project; likewise, the manufacturer should be the follower of the game if it is the one that 
can obtain more social benefit from the project. 
 
5.4       Summary 
 
In this chapter, to show how the model behavior responds to changes in parameter values, 
we conducted a sensitivity analysis by changing the values of  T ; and  ; and 
and  . Based on the sensitivity analyses, it was verified that horizon parameter T  
does not have a major impact on X, JM/JS, or IM/IS. Also, both of the tax return 
parameters and   strongly affect the investment decisions and profits of the two 
players. However, the sensitivity of parameters and  are more complicated; the effect 
of and  on X, JM/JS, and IM/IS are different in case one and two, because the leader 
is different in each case. Meanwhile, we derive managerial insights according to the 
sensitivity of each parameter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis addressed the problem of allocation of CSR to members in a decentralized 
supply chain network over time. The terminology of CSR was evaluated as investment, 
and the problem, thus, was successfully formulated by a dynamic Stackelberg game. Two 
cases, one when the supplier is the leader of the game and one when the manufacturer is 
the leader of the game, were analyzed and discussed. The equilibrium point at which 
members make their decisions to maximize profits in a time horizon was determined. A 
calculus variation algorithm was proposed and tested with both a case study and a 
numerical example.  
 
6.1       Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, we described the issue of implementing CSR among members of a supply 
chain. Governments have released a variety of regulations and policies to push supply 
chains to take various forms of CSR for the realization of long-term social benefits. It is 
unavoidable for supply chains not to bear at least some CSR under these regulations. 
However, members in a decentralized supply chain network tend to maximize their 
individual net profits. CSR is a risk for these organizations because it may lead to forced 
acquisition of additional raw materials and increased production and research costs. CSR 
can also provide several benefits, such as increased sales and tax returns and an enhanced 
corporate image. To deal with this conflict, we established a supply chain coordination 
scheme. The research objective of this thesis was to find the best way of allocating CSR 
to members of a non-integrated supply chain over time. To accomplish this, it was 
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necessary to explore the equilibrium at which both the profits of the members and the 
level of CSR taken by the supply chain are maximized. We also needed to determine who 
should be the leader of a game to execute CSR regulations.  
 
A comprehensive literature review was provided in Chapter Two. First, we pointed out 
that there is no general agreement on the appropriate definition of CSR, but that basically, 
CSR involves five dimensions including environmental issues, society, the economy, 
stakeholders, and voluntariness. Information on supply chain management and game 
theory was then presented. The application of game theoretic concepts in supply chain 
management, such as non-cooperative static games, dynamic games, and cooperative 
games, was introduced. Supply chain-related game theoretical applications were 
classified into five categories: inventory games with fixed unit purchase cost, inventory 
games with quantity discounts, production and pricing competitions, games with other 
attributes and games with joint decisions on inventory, and those with production/pricing 
and other attributes.  
 
In Chapter Three, the model design and methodology for allocating CSR to members of a 
supply chain were described. First, fundamental knowledge was provided to indicate how 
CSR is evaluated as capital, and why game theory is necessary for application in this 
model. Specifically, we highlighted that only CSR dimensions one to four, which are 
obligatory and prescribed by regulation, were studied in this thesis. Since social issues are 
often related to capital, we considered a project with CSR as a long-term investment. The 
members of a supply chain play games with each other to maximize their own profits; 
thus, the model used was a long-term co-investment game model. We discussed the 
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structure of information and the other properties of the game. Finally, the model was 
properly defined as an open-loop Stackelberg dynamic game. Furthermore, we explained 
why a general three-tier vertical supply chain network can be simplified in a model that 
only involves a monopoly and its one supplier. We assumed that all of the monopoly’s 
suppliers and retailers were identical. In addition, the monopoly controlled the uniform 
price of its product with a two-part tariff, so that we could eliminate the retailer, who is 
not a decision maker, from the game. In Chapter Three, two formulations were provided 
by selecting, in turn, either the supplier or the manufacturer as the leader of the game. We 
then applied control theory and calculus variations to obtain an optimal solution for the 
dynamic game model. 
 
A real case study was provided in Chapter Four. This case study focused on the supplier 
and manufacturer in a beverage supply chain. Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola were 
forced to replace steel cans with aluminum under a new regulation released by the 
Aluminum Can Council, because aluminum cans contain more recycled content than any 
other beverage containers. We studied two different cases: in case one, we chose the 
supplier as the leader of the game, while in case two, the manufacturer was the leader. 
Two numerical examples were then provided. The first one was a static numerical 
example. We allocated the cost of CSR to either Ball Corporation or Coca-Cola in the 
first round of the game. We calculated the results by hand. The other example was a 
dynamic numerical example, dividing time horizons into ten periods. The optimal 
solution was obtained from Matlab 7.0. Based on the Matlab ouput, we analyzed the 
results of the two cases in terms of three criteria: profits, the amount of investment, and 
the level of social responsibility taken by the supply chain. Based on the results of 
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analysis, we concluded that the ACC should let Ball Corporation be the leader in 
implementing the project, because case one, in which Ball Corporation was the leader, 
provided several advantages over case two, in which Coca-Cola was the leader, in many 
respects. Firstly, in case one, both the supplier and the manufacturer were motivated to 
play the games because their benefits definitely increased. Secondly, in case one, the 
profits of both Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola were much higher than in case two. 
Thirdly, the goal of making the supply chain take more social responsibility was better 
achieved by the game in case one. 
 
To determine if the conclusion that the supplier should be the leader of the game always 
holds, we conducted a sensitivity analysis based on the dynamic numerical example. We 
categorized the parameters into three groups: the time horizon parameter T ; the tax 
return parameters of ( )M tT x and ( )
S
tT x , which are 
 and  ; and the social benefit 
parameters of ( )M tx  and ( )
S
tx , which are  and  . According to the sensitivity 
analysis, the level of CSR taken by the supply chain was not sensitive to the time horizon, 
while the amount of profit realized by Ball Corporation and Coca-Cola was sensitive to 
the time horizon. We derived insight management from the sensitivity analysis of the 
conclusion to the time horizon. That is, if governments are only concerned about the level 
of CSR taken by supply chains, they should always let the supplier be the leader of the 
game. In contrast, if governments want to accelerate the motivation of the two players to 
take CSR by considering their benefit, they can choose the leader of the game from the 
supplier and the manufacturer in terms of the time horizon. Moreover, we know that both 
the tax return parameters  and   strongly affect the investment decisions and profits of 
the two players, but they do not impact the level of CSR. We realized another insight into 
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management from the sensitivity analysis of the conclusion to the tax return policy. If 
governments want to collect more taxes from supply chains, they should set their tax 
return policy at the minimum point of the range of 
 0.01,0.15
 and 
 0.0001,0.005 
. On the contrary, if they would like to encourage the supply chain to 
take CSR, they should establish a high tax return policy, at least letting 0.15   and 
0.005  . The sensitivity of the conclusion to social benefits parameters  and   was 
more complicated, because the choice of leader decides the impact of the parameters on 
the level of CSR, profits, and investments. The sensitivity analysis of  and   also 
showed some managerial insights. Governments should let the company that has the 
lower social benefit parameters be the leader, and the one that has the higher social 
benefit parameters be the follower of the game. This decision increases the level of CSR 
as determined by the supply, the profits, and the amount of investment of both companies.  
 
The thesis concludes with contributions and future work in Chapter Six. 
 
In conclusion, we properly evaluated the vague term ―CSR‖ by considering it as a long-
term investment. We selected a suitable game, an open-loop Stackelberg dynamic game, 
to address the problem. We modeled CSR in a decentralized supply chain from two 
different perspectives by assigning either the supplier or the manufacturer to be the leader 
of the game. We then applied feasible algorithms, control theory, and calculus variations 
to solve the problem. We also provided a case study and numerical examples, and 
programmed Matlab to obtain the solutions for the numerical examples. Based on the 
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output of Matlab, we conducted a sensitivity analysis by examining three groups of 
parameters, and concluded the managerial insights.  
 
This thesis successfully grounded game theoretical application to the allocation of CSR in 
supply chain management. The model can be applied to a large class of social issues, and 
the techniques of modeling, algorithms, and equilibrium analysis can be further applied to 
other CSR policies or contracts in a supply chain network.  
 
6.2       Contributions 
 
This thesis addresses the problem of allocation of CSR to members in a decentralized 
supply chain network over time. We found a way to evaluate the vague term ―CSR‖ and 
successfully formulate the problem. A dynamic Stackelberg game with a calculus 
variation resolution is proposed and tested with both a case study and a numerical 
example. The main contributions of this paper and some suggestions are summarized as 
follows: 
 
 The game theoretic strategy of coordination between firms in a supply chain on 
CSR is rarely discussed in current supply chain management literature.  
 
 In the model, CSR, an otherwise nebulous concept, was represented by a concrete 
investment decision, so that the abstract CSR can be simply epitomized in the 
formula. In other words, the amount of investment in CSR of each member can be 
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clearly defined so that optimal supply chain profit can be achieved in equilibrium 
by taking such CSR. 
 
 This thesis provides a conceptual framework that could help both regulators and 
companies execute policies smoothly and efficiently. For example, how much 
CSR should each member in a supply chain network bear? Who should be the 
leader of the Stackelberg game? 
 
 Based on the analysis of the equilibrium, the point at which both the profits of the 
players and the level of CSR taken by an SC are maximized? The managerial 
insights of the model not only discover a way to keep networks with CSR 
operating efficiently, but also provide tactics to command, improve, and control 
CSR projects. For instances, How long would the investment horizon be?  How do 
governments design the tax return rates, either to collect the most tax or to 
accelerate the motivation of members to accept CSR?  
 
 
 This model allocates overall social responsibility rather than just a certain social 
issue. This means that the proposed model can be applied to a large class of social 
issues. The technique of using equilibrium analysis, modeling, and the proposed 
algorithm can be further applied to other CSR policies or contracts in a supply 
chain network. 
 
 The thesis proposes a dynamic model that crosses through ten periods. CSR has 
become a popular topic over the last several decades. However, most research has 
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only focused on case studies. Researchers have discussed the significance of CSR, 
the properties of CSR, and the relationship between CSR and other disciplines. 
Game theory has been applied to CSR in the last decade to obtain Nash 
equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. However, those equilibriums were 
derived from static models. In other words, a dynamic game has rarely been 
applied to CSR problems.  
 
 This thesis took into account a number of factors, which make the model practical 
and realistic. For example, the Stackelberg game is suitable for an unequally 
powerful hierarchy in a supply chain; the two-part tariff considered in the model is 
a common strategy for global manufacturers. 
 
In addition to the above advantages, at a glance, the model proposed by this thesis also 
provides the following improvements: 
 
 The model formulates CSR coordination between members in a supply chain 
network by game theory. 
 The optimal solution for the model is a Stackelberg equilibrium rather than a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 The model studies a dynamic situation instead of a static case. 
 
In conclusion, the main objective of this thesis was to allocate CSR to members in a 
supply chain by game theory. The framework that we developed for the CSR modeling 
and analysis of supply chain networks generalizes the recent works of researchers, but 
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challenges their limitations. The findings of this thesis served three main subjects, all of 
which are very important to the fields of supply chain management, social science, and 
game theory application.  
 
6.3       Future Works 
 
The analyses and results of this paper could be extended in several directions. 
 
First, when designing the state variable, we assumed that the initial level of CSR is zero, 
and the level of CSR at the period T+1, Xt+1 is free. One reason to let it be free is that the 
regulator may not know what is or is not an acceptable final level of CSR. For some on-
going projects, the value of the state variable at the initial and final period could be set 
according to terms of the situation. 
 
Second, our model was a two-player Stackelberg game. The more powerful player was 
called the leader and the other player was called the follower. An extension is, of course, 
possible to ―one leader-many followers‖ and even to ―many leaders‖ and ―many 
followers.‖ 
 
Third, the application of the Stackelberg game concept to our model was within the 
framework of an open-loop information structure. Depending on the information structure, 
the open-loop information structure can be extended to feedback and global information 
structure.  
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Furthermore, an extension could be made to problems where there are more than two 
levels of hierarchy; again, the analysis of this paper could be carried over to such 
problems. By repeated application of the ideas used in the two-tier Stackelberg game, we 
could easily solve problems in a multi-level supply chain. 
 
Finally, in our model, we assumed that both players made their investment plan at the 
beginning of each year, so it was reasonable to formulate the problem as a continuous 
discreet dynamic game. It would be a good extension to formulate the problem as a 
differential dynamic game. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Abbott,W. F., & Monsen, J. R. (1979). On the Measurement of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Self-Reported Disclosure as a Method of Measuring Corporate Social 
Involvement. Academy of Management Journal, 22(3), 501-515. 
 
Amaldoss, W., Meyer, R. J., Rajii, J. S., & Rapoport, A. (2000). Collaborating to 
compete. Marketing Science, 19(2), 105-126. 
 
Anupindi, R., Bassok, Y., & Zcmcl, E. (2001). A general framework for the study of 
decentralized Distribution system. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. 
3(4), 349-368. 
 
Arrow, K. J., & Intrilligator, M. D. (Eds.), (1982). Handbook of Mathematical Economics. 
New York: Elsevier. 
 
Avar, Z. M., & Baykai-Glirsoy, M. (2002). Inventory control under substitutable demand: 
A stochastic game application. Naval Research Logistics, 49, 359-375. 
 
Azer A. (2001). The Ethics of Corporate Responsibility: Management Trend of the New 
Millennium.  public policy fellows report. Retrieved [2 March 2006]. from 
http://www.chumirethicsfoundation.ca/downloads/publicpolicyfellows/ 
azeralison/azeralison1.pdf.   
 
Bagchi, A. (1984). Stackelberg Differential Games in Economic Models. New York, NY: 
 Springer-Verlag. 
 
Balch, M. (1971). Oligopolies, advertising, and non-cooperative games. In  H. W. Kuhn & 
G. P. Szego (Eds.), Differential Games and Related Topics (pp. 301-311). New York: 
North-Holland. 
 
Banks, D. T., Hulchinson, J. W., & Meyer, R. J. (2002). Reputation in marketing channels: 
Repeated transactions bargaining with two-sided uncertainty. Marketing Science, 21(3), 
251-272.  
 
Basar, T., & Olsder, G. J. (1999). Dynamic Non-cooperative Game Theory  (2nd ed.). 
Classics in Applied Mathematics. Philadelphia: SIAM. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 121 
 
 
Bass, F. M. (1969). A new product growth for model consumer durables. Management 
Science, 15(5), 215. 
 
Berger, P. D. (1972). Vertical cooperative advertising ventures. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 9(3), 309-312. 
 
Bernardi, R. A., &  LaCross, C. C. (2005). CorporateTransparency: Code of Ethics 
Disclosures. The CPA  Journal, 75(4), 34-37. 
 
Bertrand, J. (1883). Theorie niathematique de la richesse sociale. Journal Jes Savunrs, 
pages  499-509. 
 
Bowersox, D. J. (1998). Introducing the strategic visionary series. Journal of Business 
Logistics, 19(1), 1-4. 
 
Brandenburger, A. M., & Stuart, H. W. (2000). Biform Games. Harvard NOM Research 
Paper No. 00-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=264199 or 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.264199 
 
Bryson , A. E., & Ho, Y. C. (1975). Applied Optimal Control. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 
Cachon ,G. P., & Netessine, S. (2004). Game theory in supply chain analysis. In L. 
Simchi, S. D. Wu,, & Z. Shen(Eds.), Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: 
Modeling in the E-Business Era(pp. 13-66). Boston: Kluwer. 
 
Cachon, G. P.,  & Lariviere, M. A. (1999). An equlibrium analysis of linear, proportional 
and uniform allocation of scarce capacity. HE Transactions, 31, 835-849.  
 
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (1999). Capacity choice and allocation: Strategic 
behavior and supply chain performance. Management Science, 45(8), I09I-1108. 
 
Cachon, G. P. & Lariviere, M. A. (2001). Contracting to assure supply: How to share 
demand forecasts in a supply chain. Management Science, 47(5), 629-646. 
 
Cachon, G. P. (1999). Competitive supply chain inventory management. In Tayur et al. 
[S. Tayur, R., & Carroll, A. B. (1999). Corporate social responsibility – evolution of a 
definitional construction. Business and Society, 38(3), 268-295. 
 
Carroll, A. B., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2000). Business & Society. Ethics and Stakeholder 
Management (4th ed.). Cincinnati, OH: South Western College Publishing. 
 
Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral 
management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34, 39-48. 
 
Carroll, A. B., (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social 
performance. Academy of Management Review, 4, 197-505. 
 
Carter, C. R., & Jennings, M. M. (2004). Role of purchasing in corporate social 
responsibility: a structural equation analysis. The Journal of Business Logistics, 25(1), 
145-187. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 122 
 
 
Chad, M., & Fraser, S. (2006). The relationship between corporate social performance 
and corporate financial performance: industry type as a boundary condition. The 
Business Review, 5(Summer), 240-245. 
 
Chen, F., Federgruen, A.,  & Zheng, Y. S. (2001). Coordination mechanisms for a 
distribution system with one supplier and multiple retailers. Management Science, 47(5): 
693-708. 
 
Chiang, W.,  Chhajed, D., & Hess, J. (2003). Direct-marketing, indirect profits: A strategic 
analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design. Management Science, 49(1), 1-20. 
 
Chiang, W., Fitzsimmons, J.,  Huang, Z., & Li, S. X. (1994). A game-theoretic approach 
to quantity discount problem. Decision Sciences, 25(1), 153-168. 
 
Choi, S.C. (1991). Price competition in a channel structure with a common  retailer. 
Marketing Science,10(4), 271-296. 
 
Chu, W., & Chu, W. (1994). Signaling quality by selling through a reputable retailer: An 
example of renting the reputation of another agent. Marketing Science, 13(2), 177-189. 
 
Clarkson, M. B. E. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating 
corporate social performance. Academy of Management Review, 20, 92–117. 
 
Cohen, M. A. & Whang, S. (1997). Competing in product and service: A product life-cycle 
model. Management Science, 43(4), 535-545. 
 
Corbell, C. J., & Karmarkar, U. S. (2001). Competition and structure in serial supply 
chains with deterministic demand. Management Science, 47(7), 966-978.  
 
Corbett , C. J., & Groote, X. D. (2000). A supplier's optimal quantity discount policy under 
asymmetric information. Management Science, 46(3), 444-450.  
 
Corbett, C. J. (2001). Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric 
information: Cycle stocks, safety stocks and consignment stock. Operations Research, 
49(4), 487-500. 
 
Cornell, B., & Shapiro, A. (1987). Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance. 
Financial Management, 16(1), 5-14. 
 
Coumot, A. A.(1897). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of 
wealth. New York: Mcmillan. Translated from French; original 1838. 
 
Dahlsrud, A. (2006). How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: an Analysis of 37 
Definitions. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, DOI: 
10.1002/csr.132. 
 
Deal, K. R. (1979). Optimizing advertising expenditures in a dynamic duopoly. 
Operations Research, 27(4), 682-92.  
 
Desai, P. S. (2000). Multiple messages to retain retailers: Signaling new product 
demand. Marketing Science,19(4), 381-389. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 123 
 
 
Dong, J., Zhang, D., & Nagurney, A. (2002). Supply chain networks with multicriteria 
decision-makers. In M. A. P. Taylor (Ed.),Transportation and Traffic Theory in the 21st 
Century. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Pergamon Press. 
 
Dong, J., Zhang, D., & Nagurney, A. (2003). Multitiered supply chain networks: 
Multicriteria decision-making under uncertainty. Available from: 
<http://supernet.som.umass.edu>. 
 
Dong, J., Zhang, D. & Nagurney, A. (2004). A supply chain network equilibrium model 
with random demands. European Journal of Operational Research, 156, 194-212. 
 
Dong, L., & Rudi, N. (2004). Supply chain interaction under transshipment. Management 
Science, 50(5), 645-657. 
 
Eliashberg, J., & Steinberg, R. (1987). Marketing-production decisions in an industrial 
channel of distribution. Management Science, 33(8), 981-1000. 
 
Emmelhainz, M. A., & Adams, R. J. (1999). The Apparel Industry Response to 
„„Sweatshop‟‟ Concerns: A Review and Analysis of Codes of Conduct. Journal of Supply 
Chain Management, 35(3), 51-57. 
 
Erickson, G. M. (1995). Differential game models of advertising competition. European 
Journal of Operational Research, 83(3), 431-438. 
 
Feibel, B. J. (2003). Investment Performance Measurement. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
SonsInc. 
 
Feichtinger, G.,  & Joffgensen,S. (1983). Differential game models in management 
science. European Journal of Operational Research, 14, 137-155. 
 
Florian, M., &  Hearn, D. (1995). Network equilibrium models and algorithms. InM. O. 
Ball, T. L. Magnanti, Monma. 
 
Frost, S., & Burnett, M. (2007). Case Study the Apple iPod in China. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 14, 103-113. 
 
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Ganeshan, and M. Magazine, editors. Quantitative Models for Supply Chain 
Management. Kluwer. Boston, 1999,]. pages I I I –146. 
 
Gans, N. (2002). Customer loyalty and supplier quality competition. Management 
Science, 48(2), 207-221. 
 
Gautschi, D. A. (Ed.) (1983). Productivity and Efficiency in Distribution Systems. New 
York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co. Inc. 
 
Göbbels, M. (2002/2003). Reframing corporate social responsibility: the contemporary 
conception of a fuzzy notion. In Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate 
Sustainability: Between Agency and Communion, Van Marrewijk M (ed.). Journal of 
Business Ethics, 44, 95-105. 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 124 
 
 
 
Goyai, S. K.,  & Gupta, Y. P. (1989). Integrated inventory models: The buyer-vendor 
coordination. Europe Journal of Operational Research, 41, 261-269. 
 
Granot, D.,  & Sosic, G. (2003). A three-stage model for a decentralized distribution 
system of retailers. Operations Research, 51(5), 771-784. 
 
Gregory, M. N. (2008). Principles of Microeconomics (5th ed.). Boston: South-Western 
College Pub. 
 
Hall, J.,  & Porteus, E. (2000). Customer service competition in capacitated systems. 
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 2(2), 144-165. 
 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1995). Innovation and natural resources: a dynamic game with 
uncertainty. RAND Journal of Economics, 26(3), 418-430. 
 
He, X., & Sethi, S. P.  (2007). Optimal slotting and pricing decisions in a dynamic supply 
chain involving an innovative durable product. Working paper. Austin, the University of 
Texas. 
 
Hervani, A. A., &  Helms, M. M. (2005). Performance measurement for green supply 
management. Benchmarking,12(4), 330. 
 
Hill, R. P., Stephens, D., & Smith, I. (2003). Corporate social responsibility: an 
examination of individual firm behavior. Business and Society Review, 108(3), 339-364. 
 
Hitzig, N. B. (2004). The Hidden Risk in Analytical Procedures: What Worldcom 
Revealed. The CPA Journal, 74(2), 32–35. 
 
Isaacs, R. (1965). Differential Games. New York: Wiley. 
Jackson, P., &  Hawker, B.( 2001). Is Corporate Social Responsibility Here to Stay? 
http://www.cdforum.com/research/icsrhts.doc  [23 June 2003]. 
 
Jca-gensen,S. (1982) . A survey of some differential games in advertising. Journal of 
Economic Dvmimics and Control, 4, 341-369.  
 
Jennings, M. M., &  Entine, J.(1999). Business with a soul: A reexamination of what 
counts in business ethics. Journal of Public Law and Policy, 20, 1-88. 
 
Jeuland , A. P., &  Shugan ,S. M. (1983). Managing channel profits. Marketing Science, 
2, 239-272.  
 
Joglekar, P. N. (1988). Comments on “A quantity discount pricing model to increase 
vendor profits”. Management Science, 3A, 1391-1398.  
 
Jørgensen, S. (1982). A survey of some differential games in advertising. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 4, 341-369.  
Jørgensen, S., Sigue, S. P., & Zaccour, G. (2001). Stackelberg leadershipin a marketing 
channel. International Game Theory Review, 3(1),13-26. 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 125 
 
 
Joyner, B.E., &  Payne, D. (2002). Evolution and implementation: a study of values, 
business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 41(4), 
297-311. 
 
Kadiyali,V.,  Chintagunta,P., & Vilcassim,N. (2000). Manufacturer-retailer channel 
interactions and implications for channel power: An empirical investigation of pricing in a 
local market. Marketing Science,19(2),127-148. 
 
Kalai, E., & Smorodinsky, M. (1975). Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem. 
Econometrica, 43, 413-418. 
 
Kalai, E., Kamien, M.I., &  Rubinovitch, M. (1992).Optimal service speeds in a 
competitive environment. Management Science, 38(8), 1154-1163. 
Kamien, M.I., & Schwartz, N.L.(1981). Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations 
and Optimal Control in Economics and Management. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing. 
Kim, K.H., & Hwang, H. (1989)  Simultaneous improvement of supplier's profit and 
buyer's cost by utilizing quantity discount. Joumal of the Operational Research Society, 
40(3), 255-265.  
 
Klemperer, P., & Meyer, M. (1986).  Price competition vs quantity competition: The role 
of uncertainty. Rand Journal of Economics, 17(4), 618-638.  
 
Kohli, B., & Park, H. (1989).  A cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts. 
Management Science, 35(6), 693-707.  
 
Kuhn, H.W., & Szego, G.P. (1971).editors. Differential Games and Related Topics. 
Amsterdam : North-Holland Publishing.  
 
Kytle, B., & Ruggie, J.G. (2005). Corporate social responsibility as risk management: a 
model for multinationals. Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 10. 
Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
 
Lai, R., & Staelin, R. (1984). An approach for developing an optimal discount pricing 
policy. Management Science, 30(12), 1524-1539.  
 
Lederer, P.J., & Li, L. (1997). Pricing, production, scheduling, and delivery-time 
competition. Operations Research, 45, 407-420. 
 
Lee, H.L.,  & Rosenblatt, M.( 1986). A generalized quantity discount pricing model to 
increase supplier's profits. Management Science, 32, 1177-1185. 
 
Lee, L., & Billington,C.(1993). Material management in decentralized supply chains. 
Operations Research, 41, 835–847. 
 
Leng, M., & Parlar, M. ( 2005).  Game theoretic applications in supply chain 
management: a review. INFOR, 43(3),187-220.  
 
Levitan,R., & Shubik, M.  (1971). Price variation duopoly with differentiated products and 
random demand. Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 23-39.  
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 126 
 
 
 
Li, S.X., & Huang, Z. (1995). Managing buyer seller system cooperation with quantity 
discount considerations. Computers and Operations Research, 22(9), 947-958.  
 
Lim, W.S. (2001).  Producer-supplier contracts with incomplete information. Management 
Science, 47(5), 709-715.  
 
Lippman, S.A., & McCardle, K.H. (1997). The competitive newsboy. Operations 
Research,  
45(1), 54-65. 
 
Mahajan, S.,  & van Ryzin, G. (2001). Inventory competition under dynamic consumer 
choice. Operations Research, 49(5), 646-657. 
 
Mahesh, N.,  & Sosic, G. (2008). Game theoretical analysis of cooperation among supply 
chain agents: review and extensions. European Journal of Operations 
Research,187(3),719-748.  
 
Mallik,S .,  & Harker, R.T. (2004). Coordinating supply chains with competition: Capacity 
allocation in semiconductor manufacturing.  European Journal of Operational Research, 
159(2), 330-347. 
 
Maloni, M. J.,  & Brown, M. E. (2006). Corporate social responsibility in the supply chain: 
an application in the food industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 68, 35-52.  
 
Mankiw  N. G. (2004). Principles of Microeconomics, (3rd ed.). Mason, Ohio : 
Thomson/South-Western. 
 
Marrewijk, M. V., & Werre, M. (2003). Multiple levels of corporate sustainability. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 44(2), 107-119. 
 
Matten, D., & Crane A. (2005). Corporate citizenship: toward an extended theoretical 
conceptualization. The Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 166-179. 
 
McAlister, L. (1988). Distribution channels: A decision theoretic model with efficiency 
consideration. In Gautschi, D.A. (Eds). (1983). Productivity and Efficiency in Distribution 
Systems (page 47-56 ). New York : Elsevier Science Publishing Co. Inc.  
 
McGuire, T.W., & Staelin, R. (1983). An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream 
vertical integration. Marketing Science, 2(2), 161-191. 
 
Mcntzer, J.T., DeWitt, W., Keebler, J.S., Min, .S., Nix, N.W.,  Smith, CD., & Zacharia, 
Z.G. (2001). Defining supply chain management. Journal of Business logistics,  22(2), 1-
25. 
 
Mcntzer, J.T.,  DeWitt, W.,  Keebler, J.S.,  Min, S., Nix, N,W. , Smith, C.D., & Zacharia, 
Z.G. ( 2001). Defining supply chain management. Joumal of Business logistics, 22(2), 1-
25. 
 
 
Medanic, J.,  & Radojevic, D. (1978). Multilevel stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic 
systems. Journal of optimization theory and applications, 24(3), 485-497. 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 127 
 
 
 
Medanic, J.,  & Radojevic, D. (1978). Multilevel Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic 
systems. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 24(3), 485-497. 
 
Moir, L.  ( 2001). What do we mean by corporate social responsibility?. Corporate 
Governance 1(2), 16-22. 
 
Monahan, J.P.  (1984).  A quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits.  
Management Science, 30, 720-726. 
 
Monahan, J.P.  (1988). Reply on "comments on a quantity discount pricing model to 
increase vendor profits". Management Science, 34(11), I398-I400. 
 
Moorthy, K.S. (1988). Strategic decentralization in channels. Marketing Science, 7(4), 
335-355. 
 
Moskowitz, M.R. (1972). Choosing Socially Responsible Stocks. Business and Society 
Review, 1(1), 71-75. 
 
Murphy, E., & Verschoor, C. (2002). Best corporate citizens have better financial 
performance. Strategic Finance, 83(7), 20-2. 
 
Myerson, R.  (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge.MA : Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Nagurney, A., & Siokos, S. (1997).  Financial Networks: Statics and Dynamics. Springer: 
Heidelberg. 
 
Nagurney, A.,  Dong, J.,  & Zhang, D. ( 2002a). A supply chain network equilibrium 
model. Transportation Research,  E38, 281-303. 
 
Nagurney, A., Dong, J., & Zhang, D. ( 2002b). Supply chain networks and electronic 
commerce: A theoretical perspective. Netnomics, 4, 187-220. 
 
Nagurney, A., Dong, J., & Zhang, D. ( 2005). Supply chain networks, electronic 
commerce, and supply side and demand side risk. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 164, 120-142. 
 
Nagurney, A., & Toyasaki, F. ( 2003). Supply chain super networks and environmental 
criteria. Transportation Research, D 8, 185-213. 
 
Nalebuff, B., & Brandenburger, A. (1996). Coopetition: a revolutionary mindset that 
combines competition and cooperation in the market place. New York: Doubleday Press. 
 
Nemhauser, G.L (Eds). (1995). Network Routing. Handbooks in Operations Research 
and Management Science, 8, 485-550. 
 
Nti, K.O. (1987). Competitive procurement under demand uncertainty. Management 
Science, 33(11),1489-1505. 
 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 128 
 
 
O‟Dwyer, B. ( 2002). Conceptions of corporate social responsibility: the nature of 
managerial capture. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 16(4), 523 -557. 
 
Parian, M. (1988). Game theoretic analysis of the substitutable product inventory 
problem with random demands. Naval Research Logistics, 35, 397-409. 
 
Parlar, M., & Wang, Q. (1995). A game theoretical analysis of the quantity discount 
problem with perfect and incomplete information about the buyer's cost structure. RAIRO 
Operations Research, 29(4), 415-439. 
 
Parlarand, M., & Wang, Q. ( 1994). Discounting decisions in a supplier-buyer relationship 
with a linear buyer's demand. HE Transactions, 26(2), 34-41. 
 
Porter, M., &  Kramer, M. (2006). Strategy and society: the link between competitive 
advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 80(12), 56-68. 
 
Prentice, R. (2003). Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy. American Business Law Journal, 
40(2), 417-444. 
 
Raghunathan, S. (2003). Impact of demand correlation on the value of and incentives for 
information sharing in a supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 
146(3), 634-649.  
 
Reyniers, D.J., & Tapiero, C.S. ( 1995). The delivery and control of quality in supplier-
producer contracts. Management Science, 41(10), 1581-1589.  
 
Roberts, S.  (2003). Supply chain specific? Understanding the patchy success of ethical 
sourcing initiatives. Journal of Business Ethics, 44(23), 159-70. 
 
Rubio, S. J. (2006). On coincidence of feedback Nash equilibria and Stackelberg 
equilibria in economic applications of differential games. Journal of Optimization Theory 
and Applications, 128(1), 203-221. 
 
S, Jtffgensen. (1986). Optimal production, purchasing and pricing: A differential game 
approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 24, 64-76.  
 
Schiebel, W., &  Pochtrager, S. (2003).  Corporate ethics as a factor for success: the 
measurement instrument of the University of Agricultural Sciences. Supply Chain 
Management, 8 (2), 21-116. 
 
Sethi, S. P. (1983). Deterministic  and stochastic optimization of a dynamic advertising 
model. Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 4, 179-184. 
 
Sethi, S. P., & Thompson, G. L. (2000). Optimal Control Theory: Applications to 
Management Science and Economics (2nd ed.). New York: Springer. 
 
Sethi, S.P. (1975). Dimensions of corporate social responsibility. California Management 
Review,17, 58-64. 
 
Shapley, L., & Shubik, M. ( 1969) . Price strategy oligopoly with product variation. Kyklos, 
XXII, 30-44. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 129 
 
 
 
Shrivastava, P. ( 1995). Ecocentric management for a risk society. Academy of 
Management Review, 20, 118–137. 
 
Shubik, M. (1955) .The uses of game theory in management science. Management 
Science, 2(1), 40-54. 
 
Shugan, S. (1985). Implicit understandings in channels of distribution. Management 
Science, 31, 435-460. 
 
Simpson, W.G., &  Kohers, T. (2002). The link between corporate social and financial 
performance: evidence from the banking industry. Journal of Business Ethics, 35 (2), 97-
109. 
 
Sobczak, A. (2007). Legal Dimensions of International Framework Agreements in the 
Field of Corporate Social Responsibility. Industrial Relations, 62(3), 466-491. 
 
Spicer, B.H.  (1978). Investors, Corporate Social Performance and Information 
Disclosure: An Empirical Study. The Accounting Review, 53(1), 94–111. 
 
Stock, J.R.  (1990). Logistic thought and practice: a perspective.  International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistic Management, 20 (1), 3-6. 
 
Svensson, G. (2007). Aspects of sustainable supply chain management: conceptual 
framework and empirical example.  Supply Chain Management, 12(4), 262-6. 
 
Tayur, S., Ganeshan, R., &  Magazine, M. (1999). Quantitative Models for Supply Chain 
Management. Boston: Kluwer.  
 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.). (2008). 
"Game theory" by Robert J. Aumann  
"Game theory in  economics" by Robert Leonard.  
"Behavioural economics and game theory" by Faruk Gul. 
 
 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
 
Trivedi, M.(1998). Distribution channels: An extension of exclusive retailership. 
Management Science, 44(7), 896-909. 
 
Ullmann, A.A. (1985). Data in Search of a Theory: A Critical Examination of the 
Relationships among Social Performance, Social Disclosure, and Economic 
Performance of U.S. firms .The Academy of Management Review, 10(3), 540-57. 
 
Vallée, T. (1998). Comparison of Different Stackelberg Solutions in a Deterministic 
Dynamic Pollution Control Problem. Discussion Paper, LEN-C3E, University of Nantes, 
France.  
 
Van Marrewijk, M. (2003). Concepts and definitions of CSR and corporate sustainability: 
between agency and communion. Journal of Business Ethics, 44, 95-105. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 130 
 
 
Vance, S. (1975). Are Socially Responsible Firms Good Investments Risks?. 
Management Review, 64(8), 18-24. 
 
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O.(1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Wang, H., Guo, M., & Efstathiou, J. ( 2004). A game-theoretical cooperative mechanism 
design for a two echelon decentralized supply chain, European Journal of Operational, 
157(2), 372-388. 
 
Wang, Q.  (2002). Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with 
heterogeneous buyers. Naval Research Lgistics, 49, 46-59.  
 
Wang, Q.  (2004). Coordinating independent buyers with integer-ratio time coordination 
and quantity discounts. Naval Research Logistics, 51(3), 316-331.  
 
Wang, Q., & Parlar, M.  (1989). Static game theory models and their applications in 
management science. European Journal of Operational Research, 42, 1-21. 
 
Wang, Q., & Parlar, M.  (1994). A three-person game theory mode! arisingin stochastic 
inventory theory. European Journal of Operation Research, 76, 83-97. 
 
Wang, Q., & Wu, Z.(2000)  Improving a supplier's quantity discount gain from many 
different buyers. IIE Transactions, 32, 1071-1079. 
 
Wang, Q. (2001). Coordinating independent buyers in a distribution system to increase a 
vendor's profits. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. 3(4), 337-348. 
 
Welford, R. (2000). Corporate  Environmental Management Towards Sustainable 
Development. London: Earthscan Publications. 
 
Weng, Z.K. (1995). Channel coordination and quantity discounts. Management Science. 
41(9), 1509-1522. 
 
Wilcox, J.B.,  Howell, R.D.,  Kuzdrall, P., & Britney, R. (1987). Price quantity discounts: 
Some implications for buyers and sellers. Journal of Marketing, 51, 60-70. 
Wokutch, R.E. (1992). Worker Protection, Japanese style: Occupational safety and 
health in the auto industry. New York: ILR Press, Ithaca. 
 
Xie, D. (1997). On time inconsistency: A technical issue in Stackelberg differential games. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 76, 412-430. 
 
Xiuli, H., Gutierrez, G., & Sethi, S. P. (2007). A Review of Stackelberg Differential Game 
Models in Supply Chain Management. Service Systems and Service Management, 
International Conference on, 1(6), 9-11. 
 
Zadek, S. (2004). The Path to Corporate Responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 
82(12), 125–132. 
 
Zhao, W., &  Wang, Y. (2002). Coordination of joint pricing-production decisions in a 
supply chain. HETransactions. 34, 701-715. 
 
 References 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 131 
 
 
Zusman, P., & Etgar, M. (1981). The marketing channel as an equilibrium set of 
contracts. Management Science,  27(3), 284-302. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VITA AUCTORIS 
 
 
 
Hong Shi, M.A.Sc. received B.A.Sc. from University of Science & Technology 
Beijing. Shi joined the Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems 
Engineering at University of Windsor, where she started her research in Sept. 
2008. Her research interest is in supply chain management, game theory and 
operation research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
